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Résumé
Dans cette thèse, je me suis intéressé aux effets des fluctuations du prix de
pétrole sur l’activité macroéconomique selon la cause sous-jacente ces fluc-
tuations. Les modèles économiques utilisés dans cette thèse sont principa-
lement les modèles d’équilibre général dynamique stochastique (de l’anglais
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium, DSGE) et les modèles Vecteurs
Autorégressifs, VAR.
Plusieurs études ont examiné les effets des fluctuations du prix de pétrole
sur les principaux variables macroéconomiques, mais très peu d’entre elles
ont fait spécifiquement le lien entre les effets des fluctuations du prix du pé-
trole et la l’origine de ces fluctuations. Pourtant, il est largement admis dans
les études plus récentes que les augmentations du prix du pétrole peuvent
avoir des effets très différents en fonction de la cause sous-jacente de cette
augmentation. Ma thèse, structurée en trois chapitres, porte une attention
particulière aux sources de fluctuations du prix de pétrole et leurs impacts
sur l’activité macroéconomique en général, et en particulier sur l’économie
du Canada.
Le premier chapitre examine comment les chocs d’offre de pétrole, de de-
mande agrégée, et de demande de précaution de pétrole affectent l’économie
du Canada, dans un Modèle d’équilibre Général Dynamique Stochastique
estimé. L’estimation est réalisée par la méthode Bayésienne, en utilisant des
données trimestrielles canadiennes sur la période 1983Q1 à 2010Q4. Les ré-
sultats montrent que les effets dynamiques des fluctuations du prix du pétrole
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sur les principaux agrégats macro-économiques canadiens varient en fonction
de leurs sources. En particulier, une augmentation de 10% du prix réel du
pétrole causée par des chocs positifs sur la demande globale étrangère a un
effet positif significatif de l’ordre de 0,4% sur le PIB réel du Canada au mo-
ment de l’impact et l’effet reste positif sur tous les horizons. En revanche, une
augmentation du prix réel du pétrole causée par des chocs négatifs sur l’offre
de pétrole ou par des chocs positifs de la demande de pétrole de précaution a
un effet négligeable sur le PIB réel du Canada au moment de l’impact, mais
provoque une baisse légèrement significative après l’impact. En outre, parmi
les chocs pétroliers identifiés, les chocs sur la demande globale étrangère ont
été relativement plus important pour expliquer la fluctuation des principaux
agrégats macroéconomiques du Canada au cours de la période d’estimation.
Le deuxième chapitre utilise un modèle Structurel VAR en Panel pour
examiner les liens entre les chocs de demande et d’offre de pétrole et les
ajustements de la demande de travail et des salaires dans les industries ma-
nufacturières au Canada. Le modèle est estimé sur des données annuelles
désagrégées au niveau industriel sur la période de 1975 à 2008. Les prin-
cipaux résultats suggèrent qu’un choc positif de demande globale a un effet
positif sur la demande de travail et les salaires, à court terme et à long terme.
Un choc négatif sur l’offre de pétrole a un effet négatif relativement faible au
moment de l’impact, mais l’effet devient positif après la première année. En
revanche, un choc positif sur la demande précaution de pétrole a un impact
négatif à tous les horizons. Les estimations industrie-par-industrie confirment
les précédents résultats en panel. En outre, le papier examine comment les
effets des différents chocs pétroliers sur la demande travail et les salaires
varient en fonction du degré d’exposition commerciale et de l’intensité en
énergie dans la production. Il ressort que les industries fortement exposées
au commerce international et les industries fortement intensives en énergie
sont plus vulnérables aux fluctuations du prix du pétrole causées par des
chocs d’offre de pétrole ou des chocs de demande globale.
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Le dernier chapitre examine les implications en terme de bien-être social
de l’introduction des inventaires en pétrole sur le marché mondial à l’aide
d’un modèle DSGE de trois pays dont deux pays importateurs de pétrole et
un pays exportateur de pétrole. Les gains de bien-être sont mesurés par la
variation compensatoire de la consommation sous deux règles de politique
monétaire. Les principaux résultats montrent que l’introduction des inven-
taires en pétrole a des effets négatifs sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans
chacun des deux pays importateurs de pétrole, alors qu’il a des effets posi-
tifs sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans le pays exportateur de pétrole,
quelle que soit la règle de politique monétaire. Par ailleurs, l’inclusion de la
dépréciation du taux de change dans les règles de politique monétaire per-
met de réduire les coûts sociaux pour les pays importateurs de pétrole. Enfin,
l’ampleur des effets de bien-être dépend du niveau d’inventaire en pétrole à
l’état stationnaire et est principalement expliquée par les chocs sur les inven-
taires en pétrole.
Mots-clés : Estimation Bayésienne, modèles d’équilibre général dynamique
stochastique, modèles vecteurs autorégressifs en panel, chocs de demande
et d’offre de pétroliers, bien-être social, emploi, industries manufacturières,
économie ouverte, Canada.
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Abstract
In this thesis, I am interested in the effects of fluctuations in oil prices
on macroeconomic activity depending on the underlying cause of these fluc-
tuations. The economic models used in this thesis include the Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) Models and Vector Autoregressive
(VAR) Models.
Several studies have examined the effects of fluctuations in oil price on the
main macroeconomic variables, but very few of theses studies have specifically
made the link between the effects of fluctuations in oil prices and the origin
of these fluctuations. However, it is widely accepted in more recent studies
that oil price increases may have very different effects depending on the
underlying cause of that increase. My thesis, structured in three chapters,
is focused on the sources of fluctuations in oil price and their impacts on
the macroeconomic activity in general, and in particular on the canadian
economy.
The first chapter of the thesis investigates how oil supply shocks, aggre-
gate demand shocks, and precautionary oil demand shocks affect Canada’s
economy, within an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model. The estimation is conducted using Bayesian methods, with Canadian
quarterly data from 1983Q1 to 2010Q4. The results suggest that the dy-
namic effects of oil price shocks on Canadian macroeconomic variables vary
according to their sources. In particular, a 10% increase in the real price
of oil driven by positive foreign aggregate demand shocks has a significant
xpositive effect of about 0.4% on Canada’s real GDP upon impact and the
effect remains positive over time. In contrast, an increase in the real price
of oil driven by negative foreign oil supply shocks or by positive precaution-
ary oil demand shocks causes an insignificant effect on Canada’s real GDP
upon impact but causes a slightly significant decline afterwards. The intu-
ition is that a positive innovation in aggregate demand tends to increase the
demand for Canada’s overall exports. Oil supply disruptions in foreign coun-
tries or positive precautionary oil demand shocks increase the uncertainty
about future oil prices, which leads firms to postpone irreversible invest-
ment expenditures, and tends to reduce Canada’s real GDP. Furthermore,
among the identified oil shocks, foreign aggregate demand shocks have been
relatively more important in explaining the variations of most of Canadian
macroeconomic variables over the estimation period.
The second chapter examines the links between oil demand and supply
shocks and labor market adjustments in Canadian manufacturing industries
using a panel structural VAR model. The model is estimated with disaggre-
gated annual data at the industry level from 1975 to 2008. The results show
that a positive aggregate demand shock increases both labor and the price
of labor over a 20-year period. A negative oil supply shock has a relatively
small negative effect upon impact but the effect turns positive after the first
year. In contrast, a positive precautionary oil demand shock has a nega-
tive impact over all horizons. The paper also examines how the responses
to different types of oil shocks vary from industry to industry. The results
suggest that industries with higher net trade exposure/oil-intensity are more
vulnerable to oil price increases driven by oil supply shocks and aggregate
demand shocks.
The third chapter examines the welfare implications of introducing com-
petitive storage on the global oil market using a three country DSGE model
characterized by two oil-importing countries and one oil-exporting country.
The welfare gains are measured by consumption compensating variation un-
xi
der two alternative monetary policy rules. The main results indicate that
the introduction of oil storage has negative welfare effects for each of the
two oil importing countries, while it has positive welfare effects for the oil
exporting country, whatever the monetary policy rule. I also found that in-
cluding the exchange rate depreciation in the monetary policy rules allows
to slightly reduce the welfare costs for both oil importing countries. Finally,
the magnitude of the welfare effects depends on the steady state level of oil
storage and is mainly driven by oil storage shocks.
Keywords: Bayesian estimation, DSGE models, panel VAR models, oil
demand and supply shocks, welfare, employment, manufacturing industries,
open economy, Canada.
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1Chapter 1
Oil Demand and Supply Shocks
in Canada’s Economy
1.1 Introduction
Oil is one of the most important commodities to the modern economy.
It fuels our cars and manufacturing, and has been known to spark political
conflicts. Thus, it’s not surprising that oil plays an important role in de-
termining macroeconomic outcomes, particularly for oil-exporting countries.
However, are all changes to oil prices created equal? This paper examines
whether the cause of an oil price change affects the impact that change has
on the Canada’s macroeconomic activity.
There is a fairly extensive literature on the macroeconomic impact of oil
shocks since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983), which finds that seven
of the eight recessions in the U.S between 1948-1981 were preceded by a
large increase in the price of crude oil. The standard approach in the liter-
ature, including Kim and Loungani (1992), Mork et al. (1994a), Brown and
Yucel (1999), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez (2005), and Kilian (2008b),
among many others, is to focus on the impact of exogenous oil shocks on
macroeconomic activity. This approach does not allow one to explicitly ex-
2amine the effects of world aggregate demand shocks on oil price movements,
nor does it allow one to distinguish between demand and supply shocks to
the global crude oil market. The role of speculative oil demand on oil price
movements has also been generally neglected in the literature. Other authors
have disentangled the various oil demand and supply shocks, but find that
these different oil shocks have similar macroeconomic effects. In particular,
Bodenstein et al. (2007), find that a rise in foreign oil demand that induces
a comparable rise in the price of oil as an adverse supply shock has similar
effects on the trade balance and the terms of trade of the U.S. economy.
More recent empirical literature has challenged the standard approach,
claiming that oil supply shock measures alone do not explain the bulk of oil
price fluctuations and that all oil price shocks are not alike. First, there is
significant evidence of macroeconomic aggregates influencing oil prices, as op-
posed to the reverse. A significant part of oil price volatility has historically
been driven by world macroeconomic aggregates. Indeed, Barsky and Kilian
(2004) find that while oil price shocks were caused by supply disruptions in
the 1970s, aggregate demand shocks have accounted for the largest share of
oil price fluctuations in the 2000s. According to Juvenal and Petrella (2011),
from 2004 to 2008, aggregate demand shocks accounted for the largest share
of oil price fluctuations, and speculative shocks have been the second most
important driver. Second, Kilian (2008a) finds that the effect of oil supply
shocks on the U.S. economy is smaller than previous estimates in the lit-
erature, which treated major oil price increases as exogenous to the global
economy. Kilian’s result suggests that the standard approach overestimates
the macroeconomic impact of oil supply shocks. Finally, and more impor-
tantly, Kilian (2009) finds that the price of crude oil is driven by different
types of oil shocks, which have very different macroeconomic effects. Indeed,
using a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model, Kilian (2009) shows
that the price of crude oil has historically been driven by distinct oil demand
and oil supply shocks, and each of these shocks have different dynamic effects
3on U.S. GDP and inflation, in terms of timing, magnitude and sign. Accord-
ing to Kilian (2009), since the start of the 21st century, oil price increases
have been driven less by oil supply shocks and more by a combination of
aggregate demand and speculative oil demand shocks. These speculative oil
demand shocks in particular have played a much larger role in driving oil
price fluctuations than acknowledged in most of the literature. The findings
of Kilian (2009) highlight the need to disentangle demand and supply shocks
when studying the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
The reason is that understanding the sources of oil price shocks is crucial
in order to design and implement macroeconomic policies to mitigate the
shocks’ adverse effects.
Recently, there has been increased interest in exploring the sources of
oil price fluctuations and their effects on macroeconomic variables. For in-
stance, Hamilton (2009) explores the fundamental determinants of petroleum
demand and supply. His results suggest that the role of speculation in driving
oil price dynamics cannot be neglected. This has been confirmed by Kauf-
mann and Ullman (2009), who find that speculation exacerbates an initial
increase in oil prices related to oil market fundamentals. Based on the work
of Kilian (2009), Kilian et al. (2009) examine several different oil demand
and supply shocks, and show that each has a different effect on external bal-
ances of the aggregates of major oil exporting countries, including Canada.
Peersman and Van Robays (2009) find that the effects on the Euro area vary
considerably depending on the source of oil price movements. These authors
use a structural VAR framework and sign restriction to identify different
types of oil shocks. In a similar study, Baumeister et al. (2010) investigate
the economic consequences of oil shocks across countries and time. They find
that economies which improved their net energy position the most over time
became relatively less vulnerable to the various oil shocks identified in Kilian
(2009). All of these studies find that there are important differences between
oil demand and supply shocks, consistent with Kilian (2009).
4Based on the empirical work of Kilian (2009), this paper develops a struc-
tural dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for a small open
oil-exporting economy. The model accounts for the three main components
of oil price innovations, namely oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks,
and precautionary oil demand shocks. Oil supply shocks refer to exogenous
changes in current oil production, aggregate demand shocks refer to fluctua-
tions in the price of oil driven by innovations to global real economic activity,
and speculative oil demand shocks refer to shifts in the price of oil driven
by innovations in inventories of crude oil. 1 The model is estimated using a
Bayesian approach described in An and Schorfheide (2007), using quarterly
Canadian data for real GDP, real consumption, real investment, the real ex-
change rate, real price of oil, crude oil production in Canada, and crude oil
production in the rest of world, for the period 1983Q1 to 2010Q4. I use the
estimated model to investigate the dynamic effects and relative importance
of the different types of oil shocks on key Canadian macroeconomic variables.
I find that a 10% increase in the real price of oil driven by a positive
foreign aggregate demand shock significantly increases Canada’s real GDP
by about 0.4% in the first quarter following the shock, and the effect remains
positive over the long run. In contrast, a 10% increase in the real price of oil
driven by a negative foreign oil supply shock or by a positive precautionary
oil demand shock initially causes an insignificant effect. The effect turns
significantly negative before returning to its steady-state level.
These results suggest that the effect of an oil price increase on Canada’s
economy depends on what is causing the higher oil price. An increase in oil
prices is more beneficial to Canada’s economy when it is driven by innovations
in global real economic activity. Such shocks tend to increase the demand for
Canadian exports. In contrast, if higher oil prices are the result of uncertainty
about future oil prices in the crude oil market, investment slows, and tends to
1. Kilian (2009) uses the term “oil-specific demand shock” to reflect the fluctuations in
precautionary demand for oil driven by uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls.
5reduce Canada’s real GDP. Finally, the variance decomposition of Canada’s
real GDP indicates that, among the identified oil shocks, aggregate demand
shocks play a dominant role in real GDP fluctuations. Oil supply shocks and
precautionary oil demand shocks account for negligible shares of the variance
in Canadian macroeconomic aggregates, in the short run as well as in the
long run. Overall, the results in this paper strongly support the idea that not
all oil price shocks are alike, consistent with the findings of Kilian (2009).
This paper is unique in several respects. It is one of very few studies that
disentangle the effects of oil demand and supply shocks using an estimated
structural DSGE model; most studies in the literature employ a VAR model.
In addition, this study focuses on a major oil producer and net oil-exporting
economy, Canada. This is in contrast with most studies in the literature,
which tend to focus on oil-importing countries, such as the U.S. Canada
is a notable case study, as it was the world’s sixth-largest oil producer in
2010, and crude oil represents a significant share of Canada’s total exports.
Furthermore, this paper differs from others by modelling the oil production
sector in a manner that recognizes the importance of this sector in Canada’s
economy. The inclusion of a cash market and storage market for crude oil
in my model is also a notable contribution. Finally, this paper provides a
comprehensive discussion of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I present
the details of the model. Section 1.3 discusses estimation issues, including
the Bayesian estimation strategy, the data used, and parameter estimates.
Section 1.4 analyzes the implications of oil demand and supply shocks for
the Canadian economy. Section 1.5 examines the robustness of my findings.
Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
61.2 Model Economy
In this section, I develop a DSGE model for a small open oil-producing
economy. The economy is small in the sense that changes in domestic vari-
ables have insignificant effects on foreign variables. In the model, there is a
representative household, an oil producer, producers of an intermediate do-
mestic good, and a producer of a final good. The inclusion of an oil producer
is meant to account for the importance of oil reserves, as well as account for
the relative capital-intensive technology used in the process of oil extraction
in Canada. The model allows for crude oil storage, such that one can formally
model precautionary and speculative oil demand shocks. In order to capture
the persistence in the data, the model allows for real rigidities, including
capital adjustment costs and habit formation in consumption preferences, as
in Christiano et al. (2005). The indexes of variables in the oil production
sector and the sector producing the domestic good are denoted by o and d,
respectively.
1.2.1 Households
I consider an economy with an infinitely lived representative household,
deriving utility from consumption and leisure, with separable preferences.
The present value of the expected utility of the household is given by:
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {log(Ct − ~Ct−1) + χ log(1−Nt)} (1.1)
7where β ∈ (0, 1) is a constant discount factor, Ct is consumption in period t,
Nt is the fraction of total available time devoted to a productive activity in
period t. The parameter χ represents relative preferences for leisure. Con-
sistent with Christiano et al. (2005), I allow for habit formation in consump-
tion, governed by persistence parameter ~ ∈ (0, 1), such that the household’s
marginal utility of consumption today is affected by the level of aggregate
consumption in the last period, Ct−1.
The household has access to riskless discount one-period domestic and
foreign bonds. The household enters period t with a quantity of nominal
domestic bonds, Bt−1, and a quantity of nominal foreign bonds, etB?t−1. The
household then receives wages WtNt and capital income Rks,tKs,t from each
sector s ∈ {o, d}. The household also receives a factor payment of oil reserve
resources, PX,tXt, where PX,t is the nominal price of the oil reserve input,
Xt. These resources are used to finance consumption Ct, investment in new
capital It (by assuming that the household owns the capital stock and rent
it to firms), and the acquisition of domestic and foreign assets to be carried
over to the next period. The flow budget constraint of the household is given
by:
PtCt+PtIt+
Bt
Rt
+
etB
?
t
ΦB?tR
?
t
= Bt−1+etB?t−1+WtNt+
∑
s=o,d
Rks,tKs,t+PX,tXt (1.2)
where Pt is the aggregate price index of consumption, and also represents
the price of investment; et is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price
of one unit of foreign currency in Canadian dollars; and Rt and R?t are the
domestic gross interest rate and foreign gross interest rate, respectively. Wt
is the wage rate, and Rks,t is the rental price of capital in sector s=o,d. ΦB?t is
a premium that the household has to pay when it borrows from abroad. This
risk premium is assumed to be a strictly increasing function of the country’s
8level of net foreign debt, relative to GDP: 2
ΦB?t = exp
(
−φb?
(
etB
?
t
PY,tYt
))
(1.3)
where PY,tYt is the nominal GDP and φb? > 0 is a parameter that determines
the debt-elasticity of interest-rate premium. As demonstrated by Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003), a debt-elastic interest-rate premium is a technical
term that ensures the stationarity of a dynamic equilibrium model of an open
economy. If the country has a net lender position internationally, then the
household will earn a lower return on any holdings of foreign bonds. By
contrast, if the country has a net debtor position, the household will pay a
higher return on any foreign debt.
The household faces an investment adjustment cost. Consistent with
Christiano et al. (2005), the function of adjustment costs depends on current
and lagged investment, and the stock of capital is accumulated according to
Ks,t+1 = (1− δ)Ks,t + AI,t (1− S(Is,t/Is,t−1)) Is,t (1.4)
where S(1) = S ′(1) = 0 and S ′′(1) = κs > 0 for s ∈ {o, d}. It is costly to
change the level of investment out of the steady state. Parameter δ repre-
sents the capital depreciation rate common to both sectors, but parameter
κs for capital adjustment costs can be different across sectors. To simplify
notation, I do not index the function S. Variables Io,t and Id,t are the level of
investment in the oil and domestic goods sectors, respectively, such that the
total investment It = Io,t + Id,t. The variable AI,t is an investment-specific
technology shock, or the marginal efficiency of investment. This shock cap-
tures the rate of transformation of investment into installed capital to be
used in production.
2. The specification of the risk premium, in this paper, is taken from Bodenstein et al.
(2007).
9In each period t, the household chooses consumption Ct, labor Nt, nomi-
nal domestic bonds Bt, nominal foreign bonds B?t , capital stocks Ko,t+1 and
Kd,t+1, and investments Io,t and Id,t, in order to maximize 1.1 subject to 1.2
and 1.4. The resulting first-order conditions are :
(Ct − ~Ct−1)−1 − ~β (Ct+1 − ~Ct)−1 = Λt (1.5)
χ(1−Nt)−1
Λt
= wt (1.6)
Λt = βRtEt
[
Pt
Pt+1
Λt+1
]
(1.7)
Λt = βΦB?tR
?
tEt
[
Pt
Pt+1
et+1
et
Λt+1
]
(1.8)
qs,t = βEt
[(
Λt+1
Λt
)(
rks,t+1 + (1− δ)qs,t+1
)]
(1.9)
1 = qs,tAI,t
[
1− S
(
Is,t
Is,t−1
)
− S ′
(
Is,t
Is,t−1
)(
Is,t
Is,t−1
)]
+βEt
[(
Λt+1
Λt
)
qs,t+1AI,t+1S
′
(
Is,t+1
Is,t
)(
Is,t+1
Is,t
)2]
(1.10)
qs,t =
Ξs,t
Λt
(1.11)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the real budget constraint
and Ξs,t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 1.4. wt = Wt/Pt is the
real wage rate and rks,t = Rks,t/Pt is the real capital return in sector s ∈ {o, d}.
The variable qs,t, known as the Tobin’s q, is the relative price or shadow price
of installed capital Ks,t+1 in period t available for production in period t+1,
in terms of consumption units.
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Equations (1.6) to (1.9) can be interpreted as follows. Equation (1.6)
implies that marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
is equal to the wage rate. Equation (1.7) implies that the marginal cost of
foregoing one unit of consumption for additional savings in the domestic asset
(the left side) is equal to the discounted future marginal benefit in terms of
consumption units derived from this additional unit of asset (the right side).
This is a no-arbitrage condition between consuming and saving in domestic
bonds. Equation (1.8) is a no-arbitrage condition between consuming and
saving in foreign bonds. The decision to invest in the foreign asset takes into
account the expected change in the exchange rate. Equation (1.9) implies
that the marginal of cost foregoing one unit of consumption for additional
investment in new capital is equal to the discounted future marginal benefit
in terms of the utility derived from this additional investment in capital. The
no-arbitrage conditions imply that the expected return on the bond markets
must be the same as the expected return that the household gets by renting
their capital to firms producing the domestic good.
In order to capture the sectoral volatility, the model allows heterogeneity
in wages and labor across sectors as in Horvath (2000) and Bouakez et al.
(2009). Specifically, households are willing to work a positive number of
hours in each sector, even if wages are not equal in the two sectors. That is,
Nt =
(
N
ς+1
ς
o,t +N
ς+1
ς
d,t
) ς
ς+1
(1.12)
where ς > 0 is the labor elasticity of substitution across sectors and Ns,t is
the number of hours worked in sector s=o,d at time t. Nt can be regarded
as an index of hours worked, and its corresponding wage index is given by
Wt/Pt =
(
(Wo,t/Pt)
1+ς + (Wd,t/Pt)
1+ς
)1/(1+ς) (1.13)
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whereWo,t andWd,t correspond to the nominal wage rate in oil and domestic
good sectors. This index has the property that
∑
s=o,dWs,tNs,t = WtNt,
thereby preserving the representative household setup.
1.2.2 Crude oil production
The economy is endowed with crude oil reserves. There is a competitive
firm producing refined crude oil using capital and the crude oil reserves with
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology of the form:
Yo,t = Ao,t
(
α
1
µ
Ko
K
µ−1
µ
o,t + α
1
µ
No
N
µ−1
µ
o,t + α
1
µ
XX
µ−1
µ
t
) µ
µ−1
(1.14)
where Yo,t, is the level of crude oil extracted at time t, Ko,t is capital, No,t
is labor, and Xt, is the level of oil reserves available. Parameters αKo , αNo
, and αX are the shares of capital, labor, and oil reserve inputs in the pro-
duction of crude oil, respectively, and αKo + αNo + αX = 1. Variable Ao,t
is a technology shock that only affects the oil sector. The parameter µ is
the elasticity of substitution among factors used in oil production. I treat
available oil reserves as a fixed factor, and do not attempt to model new oil
discoveries. 3 This input in the production process for oil extraction captures
the importance of this natural resource to Canada’s economy. The price of
crude oil, P ?o,t, is in U.S. dollars and is determined by the international oil
market.
3. The model has been designed to explain the macroeconomic effects of increases in oil
prices driven by exogenous shocks that originate from abroad. It is not meant to explain
the effects of oil price fluctuations due to new oil reserve discoveries in Canada.
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At each period, given the price of crude oil, P ?o,t; the rental price of capital,
Rko,t; the wage,Wo,t; and the price of crude oil reserves, PX,t; the oil-producing
firm chooses the level of capital, labor, and crude oil reserves, {Ko,t, No,t, Xt},
to maximize its profit:
Πo,t = max{Ko,t,No,t,Xt}
{
etP
?
o,tYo,t −Rko,tKo,t −Wo,tNo,t − PX,tXt
}
(1.15)
subject to (1.14)
From the first-order conditions with respect toKo,t, No,t, andXt, the demand
curves for capital, labor and crude oil reserves, respectively, are given by:
rko,t = stp
?
o,t × A
ξo−1
µ
o,t
(
1
αKo
Ko,t
Yo,t)
)− 1
µ
(1.16)
wo,t = stp
?
o,t × A
ξo−1
µ
o,t
(
1
αNo
No,t
Yo,t
)− 1
µ
(1.17)
pX,t = stp
?
o,t × A
ξo−1
µ
o,t
(
1
αX
Xt
Yo,t
)− 1
µ
(1.18)
where pX,t = PX,t/Pt, p?o,t = P ?o,t/P ?t and st = etP ?t /Pt are the real price
of crude oil reserves, the real price of crude oil in international oil mar-
ket, and the real exchange rate, respectively. Equations (1.16), (1.17) and
(1.18) represent the demand for the inputs Ko,t, No,t, and Xt, respectively.
These equations stipulate that the marginal cost of each input is equal to
its marginal productivity. Finally, oil output is used as an input into the
production of the domestic good, or exported abroad.
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1.2.3 Domestic good production
In the economy, there is a single domestic intermediate good produced
by perfectly competitive identical firms. The production technology for a
typical firm is given by a nested constant elasticity of substitution function
of the form:
Yd,t = Ad,t
(
α
1
ν
Kd
K
ν−1
ν
d,t + α
1
ν
Nd
N
ν−1
ν
d,t + α
1
ν
OO
ν−1
ν
t
) ν
ν−1
(1.19)
where Kd,t, Nd,t, and Ot are, respectively, the level of capital, labor, and
oil used to produce the level Yd,t of domestic good. Parameters αKd , αNd
, and αO, such that their sum is equal to 1, define the weights of capital,
labor, and oil inputs, respectively, in the production of domestic good. Ad,t
is a technology shock specific to the domestic good sector. ν determines
the degree of substitution between oil and the other factors of production.
I assume the Law of One Price holds for oil, implying that its price in the
domestic economy is given by Po,t = etP ?o,t.
At each period t, and given the prices Rkd,t, Wd,t, and Po,t, a typical
producing firm optimally chooses the levels of physical capital, Kd,t, labor,
Nd,t, and oil, Ot that maximizes its profits:
Πd,t = max{Kd,t,Nd,t,Ot}
{
Pd,tYd,t −Rkd,tKd,t −Wd,tNd,t − Po,tOt
}
(1.20)
subject to (1.19)
From the first-order condition, it follows that the demand curves for capital,
labor and oil, respectively, are given by:
rkd,t = pd,t × A
ξd−1
ν
d,t
(
1
αKd
Kd,t
Yd,t
)− 1
ν
(1.21)
wd,t = pd,t × A
ξd−1
ν
d,t
(
1
αNd
Nd,t
Yd,t
)− 1
ν
(1.22)
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po,t = pd,t × A
ξd−1
ν
d,t
(
1
αO
Ot
Yd,t
)− 1
ν
(1.23)
where po,t = Po,t/Pt and pd,t = Pd,t/Pt are the real domestic price of oil and
the real price of the domestic good, respectively. Equations 1.21-1.23 imply
that the price of each input is equal to its marginal productivity.
The domestic good can be used to produce the final good or exported
abroad. The foreign demand for the domestic good depends on its relative
price and the foreign output, Y ?t , and is given by:
Y xd,t = ωd,x
(
Pd,t
etP ?t
)−ϑx
Y ?t (1.24)
where ωd,x is a non-negative parameter determining the fraction of foreign
spending that is spent on purchasing the domestic good. Parameter ϑx rep-
resents the price elasticity of demand for the domestic good in foreign coun-
tries. P ?t is the foreign price index. Variables Y ?t and P ?t are both exogenously
given. I assume that the relationship between foreign output and foreign real
interest rate is rˆ?t = EtYˆ ?t+1−Yˆ ?t , where the circumflex denotes that a variable
is expressed as a log deviation from its steady state.
1.2.4 Final good production
There is a final good produced by a perfectly competitive firm using do-
mestic and imported goods according to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(C.E.S.) technology:
Zt =
(
ω
1
ϑ
d Y
z
ϑ−1
ϑ
d,t + (1− ωd)
1
ϑY
ϑ−1
ϑ
m,t
) ϑ
ϑ−1
(1.25)
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where the parameter ωd is the importance of the domestic intermediate good
in the production of final good. The parameter ϑ > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported goods. The demand functions,
derived from the profit maximization function for the firm producing the final
good, are given by:
Y zd,t = ωd
(
Pd,t
Pt
)−ϑ
Zt and Ym,t = (1− ωd)
(
Pm,t
Pt
)−ϑ
Zt (1.26)
The zero-profit condition implies that the price of the final good, Pt, is given
by:
Pt =
(
ωdP
1−ϑ
d,t + (1− ωd)P 1−ϑm,t
) 1
1−ϑ (1.27)
The final good is then split between consumption Ct and investment It. For
simplicity, I assume that Pm,t = ζteP ?t , where ζt is a shock to the price of
imports that reflects the deviations from the Law of One Price in the imports
price. Throughout this assumption, I allow for incomplete exchange-rate
pass-through in imports. In the rest of the paper, pm,t = Pm,t/Pt will refer
to the real price of imports.
1.2.5 Oil markets
To reflect the oil market behavior, I introduce two interrelated markets
for crude oil, as in Pindyck (2004): the cash market for immediate (or “spot”)
purchases and sales, and the storage market for inventory. This distinction
allows holding crude oil inventories for speculative purposes. Oil inventories
help satisfy demand in the oil market when there are oil supply disruptions,
and also help to smooth the production process. 4
4. There are several reasons for carrying inventories for oil, including uncertainty about
the size of future demand, uncertainty about the amount of lead time for deliveries, pro-
vision for greater assurance of continuing production, and speculation on future prices of
oil.
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1.2.5.1 Storage market for crude oil
Following Hamilton (2009), I consider a competitive representative spec-
ulator who purchases and stores crude oil today (denoted as date t) and
expects to sell it tomorrow at a higher price. Let OSt denote the inventory
level of oil that the speculator wants to hold at period t. The profits earned
by storing OSt units of oil is the difference between the speculator’s revenue
in period t+ 1, and the cost of purchasing OSt in the spot market in period
t plus the storage costs. The speculator’s profit maximization function is:
max
OSt
{
R?t
−1Et(P ?o,t+1)OSt − P ?o,tOSt − Ω(OSt, Zos,t)− κosOSt
}
(1.28)
where Ω(OSt, Zos,t) is the marketing cost i.e the cost of delivery scheduling
and avoidance of stockouts, and κos > 0 is the per-unit storage cost, which
is assumed to be constant. Zos,t is an exogenous storage demand shock. The
value of the marginal unit of inventory, defined as the marginal convenience
yield, is given by ψt = −∂Ω/∂OSt. In the commodity pricing literature, the
marginal convenience yield is generally assumed to be decreasing, such that
∂ψt/∂OSt < 0 (see Pindyck (2004), for example). 5
Given the spot price of oil, the first-order condition with respect to OSt
gives the demand function for crude oil inventories:
ψt − κos = P ?o,t − Et(P ?o,t+1)/R?t (1.29)
The log-linearized version of the storage demand function is:
OˆSt = θ
[
β(Etpˆ
?
o,t+1 − rˆ?t )− pˆ?o,t
]
+ Zˆos,t (1.30)
5. Additionally, it’s assumed that ∂ψt/∂Zos,t > 0, i.e an increase in uncertainty about
the future oil price is more likely to result in scarcity in the oil market.
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where θ−1 = −OS
P ?o
∂ψt
∂OS
> 0. Equation (1.29) implies that profit-maximizing
competitive storage will set the expected marginal revenue from storing a
barrel of crude oil equal to the marginal storage cost. I assume that the
percentage deviation of Zos,t from its steady state level evolves according to
an AR(1) process.
1.2.5.2 Cash markets of crude oil
In the cash market for crude oil, oil is sold or purchased at spot price P ?o,t.
The equilibrium condition on the cash market of oil at each period t is given
by:
∆OSt = (Yo,t + Y
?
o,t)− (Ot +O?t ) (1.31)
where Y ?o,t and O?t represent foreign oil production and consumption, respec-
tively. The total new oil production is Yo,t + Y ?o,t, while the total oil demand
for immediate use is the sum of the domestic oil demand and the foreign oil
demand, given by Ot +O?t . The consumption demand function for crude oil
in the foreign economy is assumed to have the following form:
O?t = φ
?
o
(
P ?o,t
P ?t
)−ϕ
Y ?t (1.32)
where ϕ represents the price-elasticity of oil demand in the foreign economy.
Parameter φ?o is a non-negative scaling parameter. A positive innovation in
global real economic activity implies a positive innovation in foreign oil de-
mand. I assume assume that foreign oil production is given by an exogenous
AR(1) process. The price of oil is determined endogenously in the world
oil market to satisfy equation (1.31). Because the level of oil inventories can
change from period to period, the price of oil in any period need not be equal
to the total new production and total consumption of oil. In other words, the
price of oil that clears the world crude oil market is not only determined by
current oil production and consumption, but also by changes in oil invento-
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ries. Oil inventories are included in the model to explain short-run variations
in oil prices induced by the uncertainty about shortfalls of expected oil sup-
ply relative to expected oil demand (see Kilian (2009) and Alquist and Kilian
(2010)).
1.2.6 Exogenous processes
There are seven exogenous driving forces in the model. These are a for-
eign oil supply shock (Y ?o,t), speculative oil demand shock (Zos,t), shock on
foreign output (Y ?t ), technological shock on the oil sector (Ao,t), technologi-
cal shock on the domestic good sector (Ad,t), investment-specific technology
shock (AI,t), and shock to the price of imports (ζt). I assume that the per-
centage deviations from the steady-state 6 of each of the exogenous processes
evolve according to an AR(1) process:
λˆt = ρλλˆ
?
t−1 + λ,t (1.33)
where λ = {Y ?o , Y ?, Zos, Ao, Ad, AI , ζ}. The persistence parameters, ρλ, are
strictly bounded between -1 and 1, and the innovations, λ,t, are mutually
independent, serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with a mean of
0 and a variance σ2λ. Note that the process that drives the foreign oil supply
is specified such that a positive innovation tends to lower the oil supply and
increase the real price of oil.
1.2.7 Market-clearing conditions
An equilibrium for this economy is a collection of sequences {Ct, Nt, No,t,
Nd,t, It, Io,t, Id,t, B?t , Bt, Yo,t, Ko,t, Yd,t, Kd,t, Ym,t, Zt, Ot, Y zd,t, Y xd,t, rt, wt,
wo,t, wd,t, rko,t, rkd,t, qo,t, qd,t, po,t, pd,t, pm,t, st}∞t=0, and a collection of {O?t , p?o,t,
r?t }∞t=0 satisfying the household and producers’ first-order conditions, given
6. I define xˆt = (xt−x)/x as the percentage deviation from its steady state x. Around x
and when xt is positive, it is assumed that the approximation log(xt)−log(x) = (xt−x)/x.
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the set of exogenous stochastic processes {Y ?o,t, Y ?t , Zos,t, Ao,t, Ad,t, AI,t, ζt}∞t=0.
Without a loss of generality, the domestic debt is assumed to be in zero net
supply in each period. The market-clearing conditions for the domestic and
final good require: Yd,t = Y zd,t + Y xd,t and Zt = Ct + It.
Using the equilibrium conditions in the goods, labor and capital markets,
and imposing the budget constraint of the household, I obtain the following
equation that describes the evolution of the net foreign asset position (the
current account equation):
etB
?
t
ΦB?tR
?
t
= etB
?
t−1 + etP
?
o,t(Yo −Ot) + Pd,tY xd,t − Pm,tYm,t (1.34)
The nominal gross domestic (GDP) product measured from the demand side,
at current domestic prices, is such that:
PY,tYt = PtCt + PtIt + Po,t(Yo,t −Ot) + Pd,tY xd,t − Pm,tYm,t (1.35)
where Yt demotes real GDP and PY,t the implicit GDP deflator.
1.3 Estimation Issues
For a given set of parameters, the model is log-linearized around its de-
terministic steady state. Appendix A.2 presents the full log-linearized equa-
tions. In order to accurately represent the Canadian economy’s response to
shocks, the key parameters in the log-linearized model are estimated applying
Bayesian methods, as described in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Adolfson
et al. (2007). There are several advantages of using Bayesian methods to
estimate a DSGE model, but two in particular justify my estimation strat-
egy. First, there are parameter restrictions that are more difficult to enforce
using standard maximum likelihood (ML) estimation or simulated method
of moments (SMM) estimation. Second, Bayesian methods are more suitable
for estimating models with weak identification than ML or SMM.
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1.3.1 Bayesian estimation strategy
The Bayesian estimation is based on the likelihood function generated
by the solution of the log-linear version of the model. The set of the log-
linearized equilibrium equations of the model can be expressed in a linear
rational expectation system so that the solution to this system, in reduced
form, can be rewritten as follows:
xˆt = F (Θ)xˆt−1 +G(Θ)εξ,t (1.36)
where Θ is the vector of model parameters, and matrices F (.) and G(.)
are non-linear functions of the structural parameters contained in vectors.
The variable xˆt is a vector containing the model variables expressed as log-
deviation from their steady-state values. It collects the endogenous variables
of the model and the exogenous variables. Vector εξ,t contains white noise
innovations to the exogenous shocks of the model. The vector of observ-
able variables yˆt is related to variables in the model through a measurement
equation:
yˆt = Hxˆt (1.37)
where H is a matrix that selects elements from xˆt. Given the observable
variables collected in YT = {yˆ1, ..., yˆT}, the likelihood function L(Θ,YT ),
and the prior distribution f(Θ), the joint posterior density f(Θ|YT ) of model
parameters is computed using Bayes’ theorem:
f(Θ|YT ) = L(YT |Θ)f(Θ)∫
Θ
L(YT |Θ)f(Θ)dΘ (1.38)
Since
∫
Θ
L(YT |Θ; )f(ϑ)dΘ is constant, I only need to be able to evaluate the
posterior density up to a proportionate constant using the following relation-
ship:
f(Θ|YT ) ∝ L(YT |Θ)f(Θ) (1.39)
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Assuming that the state innovations εξ,t are normally distributed with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ, the conditional likelihood function of
the model, L(YT |Θ), is given by:
lnL(YT |Θ) = −T
2
ln(2pi)−1
2
T∑
t=1
ln
∣∣HPt|tH ′∣∣−1
2
T∑
t=1
(yˆt−Hxˆt|t−1)′(HPt|tH ′)−1(yˆt−Hxˆt|t−1)
(1.40)
where xˆt+1|t = E(xˆt+1|yˆ1, . . . yˆt) and Pt+1|t = E[(xˆt+1−xˆt+1|t)′(xˆt+1−xˆt+1|t)].
A technique known as the Kalman filter is used to evaluate the prediction
of the the value xˆt+1|t. 7 Then, the mode of the posterior distribution of
all estimated parameters is obtained by maximizing the log posterior ker-
nel lnκ(Θ|YT ) = lnL(YT |Θ) + ln f(Θ) with respect to Θ. The Metropolis-
Hastings numerical algorithm is used to simulate the posterior distribution
for the model parameters. 8
7. The procedure of the Kalman filter is summarized as follows:
– Step 1: Initialize the state estimate and its covariance matrix: xˆ0|0 = xˆ0 and
P0|0 = P0.
– Step 2: For t = 1...T , evaluate recursively the following equations:
1. Predicted (a priori) state estimate xˆt|t−1 = F xˆt−1|t−1,
2. Predicted (a priori) estimate covariance Pt|t−1 = FPt−1|t−1F ′ + Σ,
3. Updated (a posteriori) state estimate xˆt|t = xˆt|t−1 +
Pt|t−1H ′(HPt|tH ′)−1(yˆt −Hxˆt|t−1),
4. Updated (a posteriori) estimate covariance Pt|t = Pt|t−1 −
Pt|t−1H ′(HPt|t−1H ′)−1HPt|t−1.
8. Further details on Bayesian estimation of DSGE models are provided in An and
Schorfheide (2007). In my study, the estimation is conducted using the Dynare toolbox
for Matlab developed by Adjemian et al. (2012).
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1.3.2 Calibration and prior specifications
Finding the steady state of the model requires solving a large system of
nonlinear equations. I use the properties of the model and various data to
calibrate some steady state ratios — implicitly related to some parameters
that determine these steady state ratios — in the log-linearized version of the
model. Then, with these ratios values fixed, I estimate a set of parameters
that are crucial to the model’s dynamics using Bayesian methods.
I estimate the vector of parameters ϑ, µ, ν, ς, ϕ, κo, κd, θ, ρY ?o , ρY ? ,
ρZos , ρAo , ρAd , ρAI , ρζ , σY ?o , σY ? , σZos , σAo , σAd , σAI , σζ , conditional on prior
information concerning the values of these parameters. The choice of the
appropriate prior information is tricky, because it requires finding the appro-
priate domain of prior information for each parameter, as well as the shape of
the prior distribution. 9 In general, I assume an inverse-gamma distribution
for parameters bounded to be positive, a gamma distribution for parameters
bounded to be non-negative, and a beta distribution for parameters bounded
between 0 and 1.
Table 1.2 presents the prior distributions on the parameters to be esti-
mated in detail. These prior distributions are assumed to be independent of
each other. The AR(1) processes have beta distributions for autocorrelation
coefficients, while standard errors of shocks have prior inverse gamma distri-
butions. Following Bouakez and Rebei (2008a), I set the prior mean for the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, ϑ, equal to
1.5. Consistent with Elekdag et al. (2008), the prior mean for the elasticity
of substitution among factors used in oil production, µ, and the prior mean
of the elasticity of substitution among factors used in domestic good produc-
tion, ν, are set equal to 0.6 and 0.7, respectively. I impose an inverse-gamma
distribution with a prior mean of ϕ = 0.44 for the price-elasticity of oil de-
9. The strategy to choose appropriate values for prior information is to start with given
values in the prior domains and adjust these according to whether the optimizer indicates
upper-bound constraints or lower-bound constraints for the particular parameter.
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mand in the foreign economy. This prior mean is consistent with the estimate
of the price-elasticity of oil demand reported in Kilian and Murphy (2013).
Following Horvath (2000), I set the prior mean for labor supply elasticity at
1. Finally, the prior mean for parameter θ is set at 5.
The following parameters are calibrated and kept constant over the esti-
mation exercise. I set β = 0.99, which implies a steady-state annualized real
interest rate of 4%. I set δ = 0.025, which implies an annual depreciation
rate of capital of 10%. Total labor is set at one-third of the household’s avail-
able time. The share of the domestic good in the final-good, ωd, is fixed at
0.68, which implies that imports represent 32% of GDP in the steady state,
matching its sample mean. I calibrate a small value for the risk premium
parameter, φb? = 0.001. This value, combined with the calibrated value of
the net-foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio, implies an average annual risk premium
of about 10 basis points. The domestic and foreign gross inflation rates are
normalized to 1. Parameter ϑx is set to equal ϑ because the two parameters
cannot be identified separately given the set of observed variables. I set the
steady-state ratio of speculative demand for oil to quarterly foreign oil pro-
duction, OS/Y ?o , equal to 0.66. This value is obtained by dividing the U.S.
ending stocks of crude oil to the U.S. total crude oil supply. The robustness
of the results to alternative calibrations of this parameter is explored later.
The remaining parameters, χ, αKo , αNo αKd , αNd , ωd,x, κos and φ?o, can be re-
lated to the key steady state ratios in the log-linearized version of the model,
and are therefore set so as to match their sample mean. Table 1.1 reports
the calibrated parameters along with the implied steady-state ratios. 10
The estimation uses seven quarterly series of Canadian data for the period
1983Q1 to 2010Q4. The starting date corresponds to the year when Canada
switched from being a net oil importer to being a net oil exporter. The data
includes real GDP, real consumption, real investment, real exchange rate,
10. One does not need calibrate parameters that do not show up in the log-linearized
model, since these parameters are a function of steady-state ratios and parameters cali-
brated previously.
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Table 1.1: Calibrated parameters and implied steady states
Description Parameter Value
(a) Calibrated parameters
Discount factor β 0.99
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025
Share of imports in the final good ωd 0.68
Debt-elasticity of interest-rate premium φb? 0.001
(b) Implied steady state relationships (in percent)
Labor share in total available time N 33.3
Ratio of consumption to GDP PC/PY Y 80
Ratio of Net Foreign Assets to GDP eB?/PY Y - 26.7
Ratio of oil output to GDP PoYo/PY Y 4.50
Ratio of Net oil exports to GDP PoOx/PY Y 0.50
Capital income share in oil output RkoKo/PoYo 30.0
Labor income share in oil output WoNo/PoYo 11.0
Ratio of Canada’s oil production to foreign oil production Yo/Y ?o 3.10
Ratio of oil stock to foreign oil production OS/Y ?o 66.0
Note: Capital and labor income shares in oil output have been calibrated following Elekdag
et al. (2008). These ratios are set in order to capture the relative capital-intensive technol-
ogy used in the process of oil extraction in Canada, in particular, for Athabasca oil sands
in Alberta or the offshore oil-rigs of Hibernia. The series for Net Foreign Assets are from
the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database. A detailed description of these series
can be found in of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
real price of oil, and crude oil production in Canada and in the rest of world.
The data is from Statistics Canada and the U.S. Energy Information Agency
(EIA). Real GDP, real consumption, real investment, and Canada’s and for-
eign oil production are expressed in per capita terms by dividing them by
the civilian labor force in Canada. Real consumption and investment are
measured by personal consumption expenditures and gross private domestic
investment, respectively. The real exchange rate is obtained by multiplying
the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of one U.S. dollar in terms
of Canadian dollars, by the ratio of the U.S. Personal Consumption Expen-
ditures Deflator (PCED) to the Canadian PCED. The real price of oil is
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Table 1.2: Prior distributions
Description Param. Shape Domain Mean S.D.
Elasticity Domestic-Foreign goods ϑ I R++ 1.50 0.75
Substitution between factors in oil production µ I R++ 0.60 0.50
Substitution between factors in D.G. production ν I R++ 0.70 0.50
Elasticity of Foreign oil demand ϕ I R++ 0.44 0.30
Labor elasticity of substitution across sectors ς I R++ 1.00 0.75
Elasticity of oil storage demand θ I R++ 5.00 5.00
Investment adjustment costs oil sector κo G R+ 20.0 20.0
Investment adjustment costs D.G. κd G R+ 2.00 4.00
Degree of habit formation ~ B [0, 1) 0.50 0.20
Persistence of oil supply ρY ?o B [0, 1) 0.60 0.20
Persistence of aggregate demand ρY ? B [0, 1) 0.60 0.20
Persistence of precautionary oil demand ρZos B [0, 1) 0.60 0.20
Persistence of technology oil sector ρAo B [0, 1) 0.60 0.20
Persistence of technology D.G. ρAd B [0, 1) 0.60 0.20
Persistence of investment technology ρAI B [0, 1) 0.10 0.05
Persistence of price of imports gap ρζ B [0, 1) 0.60 0.20
Sd of oil supply σY ?o I R
++ 2.00 1.50
Sd of aggregate demand σY ? I R++ 2.00 1.50
Sd of precautionary oil demand σZos I R++ 25.0 20.0
Sd of technology oil sector σAo I R++ 2.00 1.50
Sd of technology D.G. σAd I R++ 1.00 0.75
Sd of Investment technology σAI I R++ 4.00 3.00
Sd of price of imports gap σζ I R++ 2.00 1.50
Note: N stands for Normal, B Beta, G Gamma, U Uniform, and I Inverted-Gamma1. S.D.
stands for Standard Deviation. R+ = {x | x is a nonnegative real number}, R++ = {x | x
is a strictly positive real number}.
the spot price of oil deflated by the U.S. PCED. The spot price of oil is the
West Texas Intermediate price in U.S. dollars per barrel. Note that oil pro-
duction in the foreign economy is treated as an observed variable because it
enables identification of parameters governing oil supply shocks. Appendix
A provides more detailed about the data used in the estimation of the model.
All the observable variables are transformed into percent log deviations from
their Hodrick-Prescott trend (with a smoothing parameter of 1600) in or-
der to be consistent with the theoretical log-linearized model. The vector of
observable variables is then given by yˆt = 100 ∗ [Yˆt, Cˆt, Iˆt, sˆt, Yˆo,t, Yˆ ?o,t, pˆ?o,t]′.
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The estimation requires that the number of shocks must be greater or equal
to the number of observed variables; otherwise, the likelihood would be un-
defined due to a stochastic singularity (for more detail, see, for example,
Ruge-Murcia (2007)).
1.3.3 Posterior parameter estimates
Table 1.3 displays the prior means, the posterior means and medians, as
well as the fifth and 95th percentiles of the posterior distributions for the
estimated parameters. 11 All the posterior means lie in their corresponding
90% probability interval. Using the information in the data results in a
substantial shift in the posterior distribution relative to the prior distribution
for most of the estimated parameters. Figure 1.1 depicts the in-sample fit of
the model, by plotting the data and the model’s Kalman-filtered one-sided
estimates of the observed variables, computed at the posterior mean of the
estimated parameters. The estimated model seems to replicate reasonably
well the behaviors of each observable. In what follows, I examine the posterior
means of the estimated parameters.
First, I look at the parameters related to exogenous processes. The oil
supply shock is weakly persistent. The precautionary oil demand shock is
persistent and highly volatile. The autocorrelation coefficients of technology
shocks in the oil and domestic good sectors, ρAd and ρAo , respectively, are
estimated at 0.47 and 0.83, respectively, while the estimates of their standard
11. I used Dynare version 4.3.3 and Matlab version R2011a. A posterior sample of
500,000 draws was generated. The posterior distributions were computed by Christopher
Sims’ optimizer csminwel, a standard numerical optimization routine of Dynare. The con-
vergence diagnostics of estimates are satisfactory after 500,000 draws. These diagnostics
are based on the convergence of the Markov chain generated by Metropolis-Hastings al-
gorithms to the posterior distribution of interest and convergence of empirical averages to
posterior moments.
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Figure 1.1: In-sample one step ahead predictions
(Data are black lines and model predictions are red lines)
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Investment
deviations, σAd and σAo , are 2.67 and 0.66, respectively. Thus, technology
shocks in the domestic good sector are more persistent, but less volatile
than technology shocks in oil sector. Investment-specific shocks are slightly
persistent and volatile.
Turning to the structural parameters of the model, the posterior mean for
labor supply elasticity is equal to 0.73, lower than its prior value of unity and
implying higher heterogeneity in wages across the two sectors of the econ-
omy. The posterior mean for the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign good, ϑ, is estimated to be 0.61. This number is substantially
lower than the value of 1.5 that is typically used in calibration studies, but
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Table 1.3: Prior moments and posterior estimates
Parameter Shape Prior Posterior
Mean S.D. 90% Prob. Mean Median 90% HPD.
interval
ϑ Inv. gamma 1.50 0.75 [ 0.71, 2.87] 0.61 0.61 [ 0.55, 0.67]
µ Inv. gamma 0.60 0.50 [ 0.21, 1.39] 0.43 0.37 [ 0.19, 0.65]
ν Inv. gamma 0.70 0.50 [ 0.27, 1.54] 0.44 0.43 [ 0.30, 0.57]
ϕ Inv. gamma 0.44 0.30 [ 0.17, 0.95] 0.31 0.30 [ 0.21, 0.41]
ς Inv. gamma 1.00 0.75 [ 0.37, 2.24] 0.75 0.65 [ 0.32, 1.18]
θ Inv. gamma 5.00 5.00 [ 1.59, 12.2] 4.27 3.96 [ 2.14, 6.40]
κo Gamma 20.0 20.0 [ 1.03, 59.9] 26.7 20.8 [ 1.00, 56.0]
κd Gamma 2.00 4.00 [ 0.00, 9.68] 0.78 0.74 [ 0.46, 1.10]
~ Beta 0.50 0.20 [ 0.17, 0.83] 0.36 0.36 [ 0.29, 0.42]
ρY ?o Beta 0.60 0.20 [ 0.25, 0.90] 0.57 0.57 [ 0.45, 0.69]
ρY ? Beta 0.60 0.20 [ 0.25, 0.90] 0.70 0.71 [ 0.62, 0.79]
ρZos Beta 0.60 0.20 [ 0.25, 0.90] 0.78 0.78 [ 0.68, 0.88]
ρAo Beta 0.60 0.20 [ 0.25, 0.90] 0.47 0.47 [ 0.33, 0.61]
ρAd Beta 0.60 0.20 [ 0.25, 0.90] 0.83 0.83 [ 0.74, 0.93]
ρAI Beta 0.10 0.05 [ 0.03, 0.19] 0.08 0.07 [ 0.02, 0.13]
ρζ Beta 0.60 0.20 [ 0.25, 0.90] 0.66 0.66 [ 0.55, 0.77]
σY ?o Inv. gamma 2.00 1.50 [ 0.75, 4.48] 1.48 1.47 [ 1.32, 1.64]
σY ? Inv. gamma 2.00 1.50 [ 0.75, 4.48] 2.64 2.63 [ 2.30, 2.98]
σZos Inv. gamma 25.0 20.0 [ 9.00, 57.3] 29.2 27.6 [ 17.5, 41.1]
σAo Inv. gamma 2.00 1.50 [ 0.75, 4.48] 2.67 2.66 [ 2.37, 2.95]
σAd Inv. gamma 1.00 0.75 [ 0.37, 2.24] 0.66 0.65 [ 0.58, 0.73]
σAI Inv. gamma 4.00 3.00 [ 1.49, 8.97] 3.94 3.79 [ 2.52, 5.37]
σζ Inv. gamma 2.00 1.50 [ 0.75, 4.48] 2.27 2.26 [ 2.00, 2.54]
Note: For the description of the parameters, see Table 1.2. Posteriors are ob-
tained from 2 chains of 500,000 draws generated using a random walk Metropolis-Hasting
algorithm, where I discard the initial 250,000. The 90% probability interval for prior is
[5% quantile and 95% quantile]. The HPD stands for the highest posterior density. S.D.
stands for Standard Deviation.
is consistent with previous estimates of other small open-economy DSGE
models for Canada. In particular, the parameter ϑ is estimated at around
0.6 in Ambler et al. (2004), and 0.86 in Justiniano and Preston (2010). The
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between the inputs for crude oil
output, µ, is equal to 0.43, indicating a small substitution among factors of
production. The degree of habit formation in consumption, ~, is estimated
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at 0.36, lower than the value of 0.64 of external habit persistence for Canada
reported in Justiniano and Preston (2010), but is close to the estimates of
0.4 for the U.S. in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006). The posterior mean for
the price elasticity of oil demand in the foreign economy, ϕ, is equal to 0.31,
lower than its prior value. Finally, the estimates of investment-adjustment
cost parameters in oil’s sector, κo, and domestic good sector, κd, are equal
to 26.7 and 0.78, respectively. These estimates imply that the elasticity of
investment with respect to a 1% temporary increase in the current price of
installed capital in the oil sector is equal to κ−1o = 0.04, while this elastic-
ity in domestic good sector is equal to κ−1d = 1.3. The posterior means for
investment-adjustment cost parameters confirm the theory that it is more
costly to adjust capital in the oil sector than in domestic good sector. The
high value associated with the investment adjustment costs in the oil sector
suggests that the production of oil does not respond slowly to changes in
demand.
1.4 Oil Shocks and Canadian Economic Fluc-
tuations
This section assess the differences between the dynamic effects of the
three types of oil shocks and their relative importance on key Canadian
macroeconomic variables. In particular, I use the estimated model to analyze
the impulse response functions and the variance decomposition.
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1.4.1 Impulse-response analysis
Impulse response functions are the expected future path of the endoge-
nous variables, conditional on each shock occurring in the initial period.
Figures 1.2 to 1.4 in Appendix C summarize the responses of some selected
variables to an oil supply shock, an aggregate demand shock and a specula-
tive oil demand shock, so that, in each case, the real world price of oil rises
10% upon impact. The median impulse responses are represented by solid
blue lines, and the dotted lines represent the fifth and 95th percentile bands.
The first column of Figures 1.2 to 1.4 shows the responses to an oil supply
disruption in the foreign economy. There is an insignificant negative effect
on real GDP upon impact. The corresponding response of consumption
is significantly negative. There a significant increase in the real interest
rate, causing a significant reduction in investment. As expected, there is
an immediate increase in the production of crude oil in Canada as well as
in oil exports. The Canadian real exchange rate appreciates, and there is
a reduction in Canadian exports of the domestic good. The opposite effect
occurs for imports. An oil supply disruption in the foreign economy provides
an incentive for Canada’s oil sector to increase its production, leading to a
higher demand for labor and investment in this sector. At the same time, the
increase in the oil price causes an increase in the marginal cost of producing
the domestic good, thereby reducing the demand for labor in the domestic
good sector. A negative innovation in oil supply initially causes a small
decrease in the foreign debt.
The second column of Figures 1.2 to 1.4 shows the effects of a positive
shock to oil demand caused by a positive foreign aggregate demand shock,
such that the real price of oil increases by 10%. An unanticipated aggre-
gate demand expansion leads to a significant increase of about 0.4% in real
GDP in the first quarter. The response remains positive and statistically
significant over all horizons. The corresponding shock significantly increases
real consumption by approximately 2% upon impact, and the effect also re-
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Response Functions
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Note: All shocks have been normalized such that an innovation will tend to increase the
price of oil.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Response Functions
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Functions
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mains positive over the long run. A positive aggregate shock initially causes
a significant appreciation in the Canadian dollar. At the same time, there
is initially a relatively small decrease in the real interest rate, and and the
effect on total investment is positive. There is an increase in exports of the
domestic good, as well as in exports of crude oil, resulting in an increase in
overall exports. The rest of variables show responses that are consistent with
the theory.
The third column of Figures 1.2 to 1.4 shows the effects of a positive spec-
ulative oil demand shock that creates a 10% increase in the real price of oil.
An unanticipated speculative oil demand increase has an insignificant effect
on real GDP upon impact. The effect on GDP turns significantly negative
before returning to its steady state. The corresponding shock significantly
reduces consumption by about 0.2%. At the same time, the shock causes a
temporary increase in the real interest rate and reduces investment in both
sectors. There is an initial appreciation in the Canadian dollar, followed by
a depreciation. The shock leads to a significant increase in oil exports but
causes a reduction in exports of the domestic good and in imports. The com-
bined effects lead to an increase in foreign debt of about 4% upon impact.
The effect of an oil supply shock and a precautionary oil demand shock are
qualitatively similar in terms of dynamics for most of variables, except that
the magnitudes of these effects are different and the negative effect of an oil
price increase driven by a positive precautionary oil demand shock are more
persistent.
The impulse response functions show important differences in how oil de-
mand and supply shocks affect Canada’s economy. An increase oil prices
driven by an aggregate demand shock tends to boost Canada’s economy. In-
deed, a positive innovation in aggregate demand increases investment and
Canada’s overall exports. Since Canada is a net oil-exporting economy, an
increase in oil prices driven by a reduction in foreign oil supply or by an in-
crease in precautionary oil demand provides a larger incentive for Canada’s oil
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sector to produce more, resulting in an increase in oil exports. Consequently,
this increases demand for labor and investment in this sector. However, these
positive effects on oil sector do not offset the negative impact on non-oil sec-
tor activities. A foreign oil supply disruption and a rise in precautionary
oil demand leads to increased uncertainty about future oil prices, which in
turn leads to a reduction in investment, labor and Canada’s real GDP. These
latter effects are in line with Bernanke (1983), which claims that industries
prefer to delay irreversible investment expenditures when there is increased
uncertainty about future oil prices. Overall, impulse response functions in
this paper clearly indicate that all oil price shocks are not alike, in line with
the findings of Kilian (2009).
1.4.2 Variance Decomposition
Table 1.4 reports the posterior means of the one-step-ahead conditional
variance and the unconditional variance of some selected variables using the
estimated model. Variance decomposition is computed relative to the sum
of the contribution of each shock driving the model. The one-step-ahead
conditional variance decomposition provides the decomposition of the effects
of shocks upon impact, while the unconditional variance decomposition pro-
vides the decomposition of the effects of shocks in the long run.
I first focus my analysis on the relative contribution of the different oil
shocks. According to the estimated model, in the short run, precautionary oil
demand shocks have accounted for the largest share (about 75%) of fluctua-
tions in the world oil price. Aggregate demand shocks are the second most
important driver, accounting for about 22% of the fluctuations. Oil supply
shocks explain a relatively small share of variation in the world oil price,
with about 5% of the contribution in the short run, as well as in the long
run. In the long run, the contribution of precautionary oil demand shocks
declines to about 60%, while that of aggregate demand shocks increases to
approximately 36%.
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These results of variance decomposition of the real price of oil are in line
with those in Kilian and Murphy (2012). Indeed, they show that oil supply
shocks have a minor impact on the real price of oil because the oil supply
elasticity is near zero. Approximatively 5% of conditional variance and 7% of
unconditional variance in real GDP is explained by aggregate demand shocks.
Oil supply shocks and precautionary oil demand shocks account for negligible
shares of the variance in real GDP, both in the short run and in the long
run. Aggregate demand shocks explain the largest share of the variations in
most of the Canadian macroeconomic aggregates in the short run. Among
oil shocks, aggregate demand shocks are by far the most important source of
fluctuations in most Canadian macroeconomic aggregates, in the short run
as well as in the long run.
Now, I examine the contributions of other shocks using variance decom-
position. Shocks that originate from the domestic economy in explain almost
none the variance of the real (world) price of oil, which is what would be ex-
pected for a small open economy. Investment shocks account for about 14%
of the fluctuations in real GDP, 67% of those in labor and more than 78% of
those in investment in the short run. These shocks has been identified by Jus-
tiniano et al. (2010) as the main drivers of movements in labor, investment,
and output. Meanwhile, investment shocks are responsible for only a small
fraction of the fluctuation in consumption, which is instead driven largely
by the combination of aggregate demand shocks and shocks to the price of
imports. Shocks to the price of imports are the second driving force behind
fluctuations in the real interest rate and real wage. Technology shocks spe-
cific to the domestic good sector are by far the biggest driving force behind
changes to real GDP. Technology shocks in the oil sector are responsible for
only a small fraction of the fluctuations of my selected variables.
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Table 1.4: Variance decomposition (in percent)
Oil
supply
shocks
Aggregate
demand
shocks
Prec. oil
demand
shocks
Techn.
shocks oil
prod.
Techn.
shocks D.G.
prod.
Investment
shocks
Price of
imports
shocks
Conditional 1-step ahead variance
Real price of oil 03.1 22.3 74.5 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
Real GDP 00.0 04.9 00.1 03.6 77.3 14.0 00.1
Consomption 00.1 39.8 03.4 00.0 18.1 04.1 34.5
Investment 00.0 07.9 00.8 00.0 04.5 78.3 08.5
Real interest rate 00.0 29.2 09.0 00.0 09.5 10.4 41.8
Labor 00.1 23.2 00.5 00.0 08.7 66.9 00.5
Real wage rate 00.1 47.0 04.4 00.0 12.2 00.7 35.6
Real exchange rate 00.1 84.3 01.0 00.0 06.6 00.9 07.2
Foreign debt to GDP 00.2 91.4 04.5 00.6 01.1 00.0 02.1
Unconditional variance
Real price of oil 05.2 35.5 59.3 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
Real GDP 00.1 07.0 00.2 00.9 79.4 09.0 03.4
Consomption 00.4 68.7 00.7 00.2 13.7 02.9 13.4
Investment 00.2 17.5 01.2 00.0 18.0 46.6 16.6
Real interest rate 00.1 28.2 08.5 00.0 10.9 11.9 40.4
Labor 00.5 43.1 01.5 00.0 06.1 35.6 13.2
Real wage rate 00.3 62.6 01.7 00.1 13.4 01.8 20.0
Real exchange rate 00.3 82.8 00.4 00.1 11.1 01.6 03.7
Foreign debt to GDP 01.0 84.7 00.3 00.4 10.7 01.2 01.6
38
1.5 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I check the robustness of the previous results with respect
to alternative specifications of the production function of the domestic good,
and with respect to changes in some parameters that have been calibrated.
1.5.1 Alternative calibration
It is important to verify that the main findings from my estimation hold,
even if the baseline estimates of exogenous variables change. I examine sen-
sitivity of the baseline estimates with respect to the steady-state ratio of
oil stock to foreign oil production, OS/Y ?o , and capital’s share in oil out-
put, RkoKo/PoYo. Table 1.5 presents the posterior means obtained with
the same priors but with different parameters OS/Y ?o ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}, and
RkoKo/PoYo ∈ {0.10, 0.5}. A comparison with the first column, which repli-
cates the baseline calibration, shows that the estimated values of the parame-
ters are very similar, with the exception of the variance of the precautionary
oil demand shock, which decreases with respect to OS/Y ?o . The impulse
responses of the real price of oil, real GDP, investment, consumption and la-
bor (not presented here), are robust to changes in OS/Y ?o , whereas variance
decomposition results vary slightly. In particular, the relative contribution
of precautionary oil demand shocks to changes in the selected variables de-
creases with respect to the ratio OS/Y ?o .
1.5.2 Alternative Specification
The production process can vary depending on the good. To test the
robustness of my findings to different assumptions about the production pro-
cess for the domestic good, I consider two alternative specifications of the
production function for the domestic good, where I differ the role that tech-
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Table 1.5: Posterior means for alternative calibrations
Baseline RkoKo/PoYo = 0.10 RkoKo/PoYo = 0.50
Param. calibr. OSY ?o
OS
Y ?o
OS
Y ?o
OS
Y ?o
OS
Y ?o
OS
Y ?o
OS
Y ?o
OS
Y ?o
= 0.5 = 1 = 1.5 = 2 = 0.5 = 1 = 1.5 = 2
ϑ 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62
µ 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.41
ν 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
ϕ 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33
ς 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.85 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.75
θ 4.27 4.92 3.72 3.37 3.19 4.86 3.68 3.36 3.12
κo 26.7 22.6 22.5 21.2 23.8 29.4 28.9 30.1 30.9
κd 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.77
~ 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
ρY ?o 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58
ρY ? 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71
ρZos 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.71
ρAo 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
ρAd 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
ρAI 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
ρζ 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
σY ?o 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
σY ? 2.64 2.62 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63
σZos 29.2 34.7 24.1 20.8 19.2 34.7 24.0 20.9 19.0
σAo 2.67 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67
σAd 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
σAI 3.94 3.88 3.93 3.98 3.97 3.91 4.00 4.00 4.03
σζ 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.26 2.27
log κ(Θ|YT ) -1668 -1668 -1666 -1666 -1666 -1669 -1668 -1668 -1668
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nology plays. In particular, I consider a model (b), as in Kim and Loungani
(1992) and Backus and Crucini (2000), where the technology has capital and
oil in a constant elasticity of substitution function within a Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Yd,t = Ad,tN
α
d,t
(
(1− ωo) 1νK1−
1
ν
d,t + ω
1
ν
o O
1− 1
ν
t
) ν(1−α)
ν−1
. (1.41)
I also consider a model (c), as in Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), where the
technology has capital and oil as a CES function within a CES production
function:
Yd,t = Ad,t
(
α
1
ηN
1− 1
ν
d,t + (1− α)
1
ηV
1− 1
η
t
) η
η−1
(1.42)
with
Vt =
(
(1− ωo) 1νK1−
1
ν
d,t + ω
1
ν
o O
1− 1
ν
t
) ν
ν−1
(1.43)
where parameter α is labor’s share in the production of the domestic good.
The form of the production technology implies that oil and capital are used
to produce capital services, which are combined with labor to produce goods.
Parameter ωo is the bias towards oil in producing capital services, while ν
represents the elasticity of substitution between capital and oil. In model (c),
η is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital services. Note
that model (b) is a particular case of model (c) where η = 1.
Table 1.6 presents the estimates of posterior means of the different models
using the baseline calibration. The estimated values of the same parameters
in model (c) are very similar to those of baseline model. In addition, Figure
1.5 shows very similar patterns of impulse response from model (c) to those
from the baseline model for the same variables. The posterior density is
higher in the case of the baseline model and model (c) relative, to model (b).
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Table 1.6: Posterior means for alternative specification
Description Parameter Baseline
model
Model
(b)
Model
(c)
Elasticity Domestic-Foreign goods ϑ 0.61 0.60 0.62
Substitution between factors in oil production µ 0.43 0.39 0.42
Substitution between K-O in D.G. production ν 0.44 0.42 0.54
Substitution between N-KO in D.G. production η - - 0.40
Elasticity of Foreign oil demand ϕ 0.31 0.31 0.31
Labor elasticity of substitution across sectors ς 0.75 0.77 0.74
Elasticity of oil storage demand θ 4.27 4.32 4.27
Investment adjustment costs oil sector κo 26.7 27.0 25.4
Investment adjustment costs D.G. κd 0.78 1.03 0.79
Degree of habit formation ~ 0.36 0.38 0.36
Persistence of oil supply ρY ?o 0.57 0.57 0.57
Persistence of aggregate demand ρY ? 0.70 0.70 0.71
Persistence of precautionary oil demand ρZos 0.78 0.78 0.78
Persistence of technology oil sector ρAo 0.47 0.47 0.47
Persistence of technology D.G. ρAd 0.83 0.80 0.83
Persistence of investment technology ρAI 0.08 0.07 0.08
Persistence of price of imports gap ρζ 0.66 0.65 0.66
Sd of oil supply σY ?o 1.48 1.48 1.47
Sd of aggregate demand σY ? 2.64 2.70 2.64
Sd of precautionary oil demand σZos 29.2 29.5 29.2
Sd of technology oil sector σAo 2.67 2.67 2.67
Sd of technology D.G. σAd 0.66 0.69 0.66
Sd of Investment technology σAI 3.94 4.92 3.97
Sd of price of imports gap σζ 2.27 2.09 2.26
(log) Posterior kernel log κ(Θ|YT ) -1668 -1670 -1668
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Response Functions for alternative specification
Model (b)
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Note: All shocks have been normalized such that an innovation will tend to increase the
price of oil.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper uses a structural DSGE model to investigate the dynamic
effects and the relative importance of oil supply shocks, aggregate demand
shocks, and precautionary oil demand shocks on Canada’s economy. The
model is estimated using Canadian quarterly data for the period 1983Q1
to 2010Q4, and using Bayesian methods. The in-sample fit of the estimated
model is satisfactory. The analysis of impulse response functions and variance
decomposition shows important differences in how oil demand and supply
shocks affect Canadian macroeconomic variables. According to the results
from the estimated model, an oil price increase is more beneficial to the
Canada’s economy when that increase is caused by increased innovation in
global economic activity. On the other hand, an increase in the real price of
oil driven by negative innovations in foreign oil supply or by positive precau-
tionary oil demand shocks has little negative effect on Canada’s real GDP.
Finally, the variance decomposition over the estimation period indicates that,
among the different oil shocks, foreign aggregate demand shocks have been
relatively more important in explaining the variance of most of Canadian
macroeconomic variables. Oil supply shocks and precautionary oil demand
shocks have a negligible effect on the variance of real GDP and most other
macroeconomic variables.
This paper makes a unique contribution to the literature by disentangling
the effects of the three main type of oil price shocks in an estimated structural
DSGE model for an oil-exporting economy. Furthermore, this paper differs
from others by explicitly modelling the oil production sector, which allows
the model to take into account the importance of this sector to Canada’s
economy. The introduction of cash market and storage market for crude oil
is also a notable distinction. Finally, this paper provides a comprehensive
discussion of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.
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There has been a perception that Canada, as a net oil-exporting country,
enjoys a net economic benefit when crude oil prices increase and suffers when
prices decline. According to the results of this paper, this perception should
be reconsidered.
Future research could focus on relaxing some of the model’s restrictions.
For example, the model could be extended to allow for nominal rigidities in
prices, or to allow for central bank or government intervention.
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Chapter 2
Oil Shocks and Labor
Adjustments in Canadian
Manufacturing Industries
2.1 Introduction
Oil price fluctuations have important effects on many industries. Cana-
dian manufacturing industries are no exception, as they depend on oil to fuel
the production process. In 2008, manufacturing accounted for 51% of all
industrial energy demand. 1
Manufacturing is more vulnerable to oil price shocks because it is more
energy intensive than other sectors. Moreover, since manufacturing is af-
fected by international trade, it is also exposed to the effects of exchange rate
fluctuations. Oil price fluctuations affect manufacturing industries through
revenue and cost channels. Greater export orientation increases the revenue
arising from a dollar depreciation and vice versa. An increase in the oil price
1. Energy from electricity, hydro, nuclear and steam are excluded. When including
these types of energy, manufacturing accounted for 62 per cent of all industrial energy
demand in 2008.
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leads to an appreciation of the Canadian dollar, all else equal, which, in
turn, causes a decrease in the export volume and revenue of manufacturing
companies. In contrast, for industries that are net importers, an appreci-
ation of the Canadian dollar could improve the industry’s competitiveness
and expand its labor demand. Therefore, oil price increases that lead to the
Canadian dollar appreciating positively affect manufacturing industries by
reducing their cost of imported non-oil inputs. An increase in the oil price
also leads to an increase in production costs for manufacturing companies,
since energy is an essential input into production.
This paper is motivated by two main reasons. First, most of studies ex-
amining the macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks in Canada focus
on aggregate data. Unfortunately, no study has disentangled the effects of
oil demand and supply shocks on labor market activity using disaggregated
data at the industry level. Second, recent findings by Somé (2012), using
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, show that oil demand and
supply shocks have different effects on most Canadian macroeconomic aggre-
gates.
This paper analyzes how oil demand and supply shocks affect the labor
market in Canadian manufacturing industries. In addition, I examine how
the degree of companies’ net trade exposure and energy intensity affect the
magnitude of the impulse responses of labor market variables to the different
types of oil price shocks.
I model the labor market in a similar fashion to Campa and Goldberg
(2001). However, I adopt a panel structural vector autoregressive (VAR)
approach instead of equation-by-equation regressions. I conduct estimations
using disaggregated annual data for Canada at the three-digit industry level
under the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) from
1975 to 2008. 2 Industries are classified in high and low net trade exposure
groups using a methodology developed by Dion (2000). Industries are clas-
2. The starting date, 1975, is dictated by the availability of data.
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sified in energy-intense and low-energy groups. Since the measure of labor
demand is central in this empirical work, I use two measures of labor demand
to ensure robustness: the labor input index and the total number of hours
worked.
I have two key findings. First, the responses of labor demand and real
wages (the relative price of labor) to the different types of oil shocks are all
significant on impact. Second, the oil price fluctuations have significantly
different effects on labor in Canada’s manufacturing industries depending on
what cause the oil price fluctuations. A positive aggregate demand shock
has a positive effect on labor market variables over all horizons. A negative
oil supply shock has a relatively small negative effect on labor only upon
impact. The effect turns positive one year after the shock, and remains
negative over all future horizons. A positive precautionary oil demand shock
has a negative impact over all horizons. In addition, I find that Industries
with higher net trade exposure/oil-intensity are more vulnerable to oil supply
shock and aggregate demand shock.. These results are still robust when I
use total number of jobs instead of the labor input index as an alternative
measure of labor activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I present a
brief review of the literature. Section 2.3 presents my econometric model.
Section 2.4 describes the data. In section 2.5, I present the estimation
methodology, including preliminary econometric tests and the identification
strategy of the model. Section 2.6 presents the estimation results and their
interpretation; the section also analyzes the result sfor the full panel as well
as for the sub-panels of high and low trade-exposed industries and the sub-
panels of energy-intense and low-energy industries. Finally, section 2.7 con-
cludes.
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2.2 Relevant literature
The effect of oil shocks on labor market adjustments is a significant is-
sue that has been widely studied in the literature. Loungani (1986) finds
that the dispersion of employment growth across industries is substantially
due to the varying impact of oil shocks across industries. Hamilton (1988)
extends the work of Loungani (1986) and shows that volatility in the prices
of primary commodities could lead to a reduction in aggregate employment.
Hamilton (1988) argues that workers of adversely affected sectors remain un-
employed while waiting for conditions to improve in their own sector, rather
than move to positively affected sectors. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) find
that oil shocks account for about one quarter of the variance of U.S. man-
ufacturing employment growth from 1972 to 1988. They also show that oil
shocks generate important job reallocation within the manufacturing sector.
Papapetrou (2001) finds that oil shocks have adverse effects on industrial
production and employment in Greece’s economy. Bernanke (1983) suggests
that oil price volatility also affects employment in manufacturing industries
through uncertainty in investments as suggested. This implies that when a
firm faces increased uncertainty about the price of oil as a result of high oil
price volatility, it is optimal for the firm to delay irreversible projects if the
returns are closely related to oil prices; firms should wait for new informa-
tion that will help them estimate the project’s return. Finally, recent studies,
such as Kilian (2009) and Somé (2012), indicate that different oil price shocks
can have different dynamic effects on real macroeconomic variables.
Empirical studies of Canada’s economy have focused attention on the
link between oil price fluctuations and their effects on real GDP (e.g., Mork
et al. (1994a)) and the Canada-U.S. exchange rate (e.g., Leung and Yuen
(2005), Ferraro et al. (2012)). However, these studies do not consider the
possibility that oil shocks may affect the manufacturing sector different than
other industries. Manufacturing could be more sensitive to changes in oil
prices, due to the fact that it is more energy-intensive.
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The main contribution of this paper is an estimation of the impact of oil
demand and oil supply shocks on labor demand and the price of labor in
Canadian manufacturing industries using a panel VAR model.
2.3 Model of the labor market
To study the dynamic adjustment of labor to oil price shocks, I use a
theoretical framework similar to the one in Campa and Goldberg (2001).
The model assumes that manufacturing industries have three inputs: labor
(Lt), capital, and energy (oil, in this case). The respective prices of the inputs
are denoted by Wt, Zt and etPo,t, where et is the exchange rate and Po,t is
the international price of oil. Within an industry, the demand for labor
is subject to adjustment costs, and the demand for the industry’s output
is assumed to be a function of aggregate demand (Yw,t) and the exchange
rate. Assuming that labor supply is an increasing function of wages and a
decreasing function of aggregate demand, Campa and Goldberg (2001) show
that, for a given industry i, the solution of the labor market equilibrium
conditions is given by the two following equations in reduced-form:
Li,t = α0,i + αi,1Li,t−1 + αi,2Zi,t + αi,3Yw,t + αi,4et + αi,5Po,t + i,t(2.1)
Wi,t = βi,0 + βi,1Li,t−1 + βi,2Zi,t + βi,3Yw,t + βi,4et + βi,5Po,t + i,t (2.2)
where all variables are logarithms. Equations 2.1 and 2.2 are commonly
used in the literature, such as by by Revenga (1992) and Leung and Yuen
(2005). An alternative specification used by Dekle (1998) is based only on
the structural form of the labor demand equation, including the industry-
specific price of labor. Delke takes this approach because specification errors
in the labor supply lead to specification errors in equilibrium equations 2.1
and 2.2.
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In this paper, I follow a panel VAR approach, which is a one-stage ap-
proach for identifying the impact of the different types of oil shocks on labor
activity. This one-stage approach is desirable, because any two-stage ap-
proach would involve a generated regressor problem.
2.4 Data
I use annual data from 20 Canadian manufacturing industries at the 3-
digit industry level under the NAICS classification, and aggregate-level data
from 1975 to 2008. The data comes from Statistics Canada and the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
There are six baseline variables: the labor input index (Li,t), 3 the relative
price of capital (Zi,t), the relative price of labor (Wi,t), the real price of oil
(Po,t), the aggregate demands, and global crude oil production. I use the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Industrial Production Index as a proxy
for aggregate demand for manufacturing goods. The data on global crude oil
production comes from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The
real price of oil is given by the U.S.-dollar spot price for a barrel of West
Texas Intermediate oil, deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index. The
labor input in manufacturing industries is a chained-Fisher aggregation of
hours worked for all workers, classified by education, work experience, and
class of workers. The relative price of labor is the ratio of labor compensation
to the Fisher volume index of labor input, deflated by the Consumer Price
Index. The relative price of capital is the ratio of the capital cost index to
the Fisher volume index of capital input, deflated by the Consumer Price
3. An alternative measure of labor demand is the number of jobs (Ei;t). I use this
measure later in the paper in robustness checks.
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Index. Because the real CAD-USD exchange rate and the international real
price of oil are highly correlated, the real exchange rate is not included in
the VAR model to avoid issues related to oil shock identification. Additional
details about the data are presented in Appendix C.
I split the full panel into high and low trade-exposed industries based on a
measure of net international trade exposure for each manufacturing industry,
using a methodology developed by Dion (2000). This measure is defined as
the ratio of exports to production, less the ratio of imported inputs used
in production, plus competing imports as a share of the domestic market. 4
For this study, the classification is based on the industry average between
1992 and 2007. Industries with a net international trade exposure below the
manufacturing sector average are placed in the low trade exposure group.
The full panel of manufacturing industries is also split into a sub-panel of
energy intensive manufacturing industries, and a sub-panel of low-energy
manufacturing industries. Energy intensity is defined as energy consumption
relative to GDP for a given industry. Table 2.1 presents the classifications
according to the degree of trade exposure and according to energy intensity.
2.5 Estimation methodology
This section discusses the identification strategy for my panel VAR model,
as well as preliminary econometric tests, including cross-sectional dependence
(CSD) tests, unit root tests, and cointegration tests.
4. Apparent Domestic Market = Manufacturing Revenues + Total Imports - Total Ex-
ports.
Net trade exposure = Exports/Revenues - Imports/Revenues + Imports/Apparent Do-
mestic Market.
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Table 2.1: List of manufacturing industries by degree of trade exposure and
by energy intensity
NAICS Industries Trade Energyexposure intensity
311 Food High High
312 Beverage and tobacco products Low Low
313-314 Textile and textile product mills Low High
315 Clothing Low Low
316 Leather and allied products Low Low
321 Wood products High High
322 Paper High High
323 Printing and related support activities Low Low
324 Petroleum and coal products High High
325 Chemicals High High
326 Plastics and rubber products High High
327 Non-metallic mineral products Low High
331 Primary metals High High
332 Fabricated metal products Low High
333 Machinery High Low
334 Computers and electronic products Low Low
335 Electrical equipment, appliances and components Low Low
336 Transportation equipment High Low
337 Furniture and related products High Low
339 Miscellaneous Low Low
Note: The classification according the degree of net trade exposure is based on the industry
net trade exposure average between 1992 and 2008. The classification according the energy
intensity is based on the industry energy intensiveness average between 1975 and 2008.
2.5.1 Preliminary tests
I conduct unit root tests for variables common to all industries (Qo,t,
Yw,t, Po,t) using the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron unit
root tests. The null hypothesis for both tests is the presence of a unit root,
and the alternative hypothesis is that the variable in question is stationary.
The Phillips-Perron test uses Newey-West standard errors to account for
potential serial correlation, whereas the augmented Dickey-Fuller test uses
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additional lags of the first-difference variable. Table 2.2 shows that both
types of unit root test clearly reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
for any industry-specific variable. But first-difference variables are stationary
at the 5% significance level.
Table 2.2: Unit root tests for aggregated variables
p-value: Augmented p-value: Levin-Lin
Dickey-Fuller
Variable No trend With trend No trend With trend
World oil production 0.932 0.083 0.772 0.569
World oil production (first difference) 0.036 0.085 0.000 0.002
Industrial Production Index (IPI) 0.792 0.299 0.636 0.525
IPI (first difference) 0.008 0.044 0.003 0.018
Oil price 0.763 0.983 0.784 0.984
Oil price (first difference) 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000
Note: The null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. The optimal lag length for the
test is chosen according the Akaike criterion.
Prior to the unit root tests for industry-specific variables, I test for the
presence of Cross-Section Dependence (CSD) between industries for each
industry-specific variable, using the parametric testing procedure proposed
by Pesaran (2004). If there is CSD, it must be taken into account in the unit
root test procedure. The CSD test employs the correlation coefficients be-
tween time periods for each panel unit. Under the null hypothesis, the cross-
sectional dependence statistic has a standard normal distribution. The test
is robust to nonstationarity, parameter heterogeneity and structural breaks,
and performs well even in small samples.
The null hypothesis is rejected for all industry-specific variables. There-
fore, the industry-specific dynamics must be taken into account by the unit
root tests. As such, I conduct a unit root test proposed by Pesaran (2007)
for each industry-specific variable with CSD. To eliminate CSD, the standard
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Table 2.3: Cross-Section Dependence tests
Variable CSD test p-value
Labor index 6.86 0.000
Employment 7.84 0.000
Relative price of labor 23.76 0.000
Relative price of capital 21.22 0.000
Note: The null hypothesis is a standard normal distribution for the CSD test statistic.
Dickey-Fuller regressions are augmented with the cross-sectional averages of
lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series. Under the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity, the test statistic has a standard normal dis-
tribution.
The results from the unit root tests in Table 2.4 show that all industry-
specific variables contain unit roots but are stationary in first difference at
the 5% significance level. The results are robust to the inclusion of a trend.
Table 2.4: Panel unit root tests for industry-specific variables
p-value, Pesaran (2007) unit root tests
Variable No trend With trend
Labor 1.000 1.000
Labor (first difference) 0.000 0.000
Employment 1.000 1.000
Employment (first difference) 0.000 0.000
Relative price of labor 0.069 0.575
Relative price of labor (first difference) 0.000 0.000
Relative price of capital 0.727 0.730
Relative price of capital (first difference) 0.000 0.000
Note: The null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. The optimal lag length for the
test is chosen according the Akaike criterion.
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All variables are transformed to growth rates by taking the first difference
of the natural logarithms. I investigate the labor market response to the
different type of oil price shocks using the following panel VAR(1) model:[
Ni,t
Xw,t
]
= µi + Φ
[
Ni,t−1
Xw,t−1
]
+B
[
eNi,t
eXwt
]
(2.3)
where Ni,t =
[
Li,t,Wi,t, Zi,t
]′
and Xw,t =
[
Qo,t, Yw,t, Po,t
]′
.
The vector of endogenous variables is divided into two groups. The first
block of variables, Ni,t, includes only industry-specific variables: the labor
input (Li,t), the relative price of labor (Wi,t), and the relative price of capital
(Zi,t). The second group, Xw,t, captures the supply and demand conditions
in the crude oil market and includes world oil production (Qo,t); a measure
of world economic activity Yw,t which is approximate by the G-17 Industrial
Production Index; and the real price of crude oil (Po,t). The vectors eNi,t and
eXwt are structural innovations to Ni,t and Xw,t. Letting Yi,t =
[
Ni,t, Xw,t
]′
and ei,t =
[
eNi,t, e
Xw
t
]′
, the panel VAR specification can be rewritten in first
difference in the following general representation:
∆Yi,t = Φ∆Yi,t−1 + ∆i,t (2.4)
where the structural orthogonalized innovations are linear combinations of
the reduced form innovations by Bei,t = i,t, such that BB′ = Ω , where
Ω is the covariance matrix of the errors i,t. I further assume a near-panel
structural VAR, where the three (foreign) oil market variables, Y2 = Xw,
are assumed to stay unaffected by the other three industry-specific variables,
Y1 = Ni. Because of the exogeneity of Xw, the lag parameter Φ is an upper
block triangular matrix:
Φ =
(
ΦY1,Y1 ΦY1,Y2
0 ΦY2,Y2
)
(2.5)
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The model parameters (Φ and Ω) are estimated using a quasi-maximum
likelihood method from Binder et al. (2005). These estimators are consis-
tent irrespective of whether the underlying time series are stationary and
cointegrated.
2.5.2 Identification of different types of oil shocks
Identifying oil demand and oil supply shocks has become very popular
in the literature because it is widely accepted that oil price increases have
very different effects depending on the underlying cause of that increase (see
Kilian (2009)).
Many empirical methods have been proposed to identify oil demand and
oil supply shocks in the global crude oil market. The first generation of meth-
ods, which includes the structural VAR model proposed by Kilian (2009), is
based on the assumption of a short-run vertical oil supply curve. It is as-
sumed that shifts in the demand for oil do not have contemporaneous effects
on the level of oil production. In addition, Kilian postulates that economic
activity is not immediately affected by oil-specific demand shocks. His iden-
tification scheme is, however, less appropriate for estimations with quarterly
or annual data.
More recent methods have relaxed some of the identifying assumptions
in Kilian (2009), with the help of sign restrictions on the implied impulse
response functions. 5 For example, Baumeister and Peersman (2012a) pro-
pose a strategy to identify the different types of oil shocks by employing a
sign restriction of time-varying impulse responses in a quarterly structural
VAR model. Kilian and Murphy (2012) use a monthly structural VAR model
to identify oil shocks. Both models only impose sign restrictions during the
impact period, as they are « more agnostic about some of the dynamic re-
sponses of crude oil production and global real activity and do not wish to
rule out that general equilibrium effects may cause a sign reversal. » In ad-
5. See Baumeister and Peersman (2012a) and Kilian and Murphy (2012), among others.
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dition to the sign restrictions, they also impose an upper bound of 0.0258 on
the elasticity of the supply of oil with respect to the real price of oil. Kilian
and Murphy (2012) find that a positive aggregate demand shock tends to
increase oil production, stimulate real activity and increase the real price
of oil on impact. A positive oil-market-specific demand shock will raise the
real price of oil on impact and stimulate oil production, but will lower real
activity. An unexpected oil supply disruption will, by construction, lower oil
production on impact. It also will lower real activity, while increasing the
real price of oil.
To disentangle the three different types of shocks (eXwt ) on oil market
variables, I impose zero and sign restrictions, combined with elasticity bounds
as used by Kilian and Murphy (2012). However, since this study uses annual
data, the sign restrictions are assumed to hold only for the first year after
the shocks. The impulse responses of the other variables to oil shocks are
left unconstrained in the estimation and their responses are fully determined
by the data. In addition, the bounds imposed on the price elasticity of oil
supply are adjusted accordingly. Data provided by the Energy Information
Administration show that, between 1989 and 1990 and during the Gulf War,
the production of crude oil increased by 1.2%, whereas the real price of crude
oil jumped by 18.6%, implying an elasticity of 0.064 of the supply of oil with
respect to the real price of oil. Table 2.5 shows the sign restrictions on the
impulse response functions (see Appendix B.2) to disentangle the different
oil shocks.
Identification of the different structural shocks requires an estimate of the
M×M matrix B˜ in t = B˜et. Consider Ω = PΛP ′ and B = PΛ0.5, such that
B satisfies Ω = BB′. Then B˜ = BQ also satisfies B˜B˜′ for any orthogonal
M ×M matrix Q. The set of identifying matrices B˜ is constructed via the
following steps:
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Table 2.5: Sign restrictions on impact responses
Structural shocks Li Wi Zi Qo Yw Po
1. Labor shock + 0 0 0
2. Shock on wages + 0 0 0
3. Shock on price of capital + 0 0 0
4. Oil supply shock (disruption) - - +
5. Aggregate demand shock + + +
6. Oil-specific demand shock + - +
Note: The sign restrictions are assumed to hold only for the first year after the shocks.
1. Compute B = PΛ0.5, where Λ is a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues
of Ω, and P is a matrix whose columns are the corresponding eigen-
vectors.
2. Draw anM×M random matrix Q from the set of orthogonal matrices,
such that (BQ, Φ) satisfies the zero restrictions on the impulse response
functions.
3. Keep Q if the sign restrictions of the impulse response functions are
satisfied.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 a large number of times, recording each Q that
satisfies the identifying restrictions.
2.6 Empirical results
In this section, I present the results of estimations for the full panel. I
examine the dynamic effects and the relative importance of the three dif-
ferent types of oil shocks on labor demand and the relative price of labor,
through the impulse response functions and the variance decomposition. I
then analyze how the effects of the different oil shocks vary with respect
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to companies’ energy intensity and net trade exposure. I compare the im-
pulse responses for the two sub-panels of high- and low-trade industries, as
well as the impulse responses for the two sub-panels of energy-intensive and
low-energy industries.
2.6.1 Results for all manufacturing industries
For a VAR model, the correct lag length is critical to obtaining good
estimates. Too short of a lag may produce serially correlated errors and bias
the remaining coefficients. Too long of a lag leads to a loss of degrees of
freedom and over-parameterization. In this study, the optimal lag length is
determined using the likelihood ratio test. The result of the test indicates
that a lag length of one is optimal. 6
The estimates of coefficients in Φ of model 2.4 are reported in Table 2.6.
Most of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level and have
the expected sign. The one-period lag of the oil price has a significant and
negative impact on labor demand, but it has a positive impact on the real
wage. The coefficient for the relative price of labor, Wi,t−1, is unexpectedly
positive, but not statistically significant. Meanwhile, the coefficient for the
one-period lag of the capital-price, Zt−1, is significant and positively corre-
lated with the labor input, suggesting that capital and labor are substitutes.
As expected, the coefficient for global demand, Yw,t−t, is positive and not
significant. This means that labor demand in Canadian manufacturing in-
dustries is higher when world real economic activity increases. Finally, there
is a negative relationship between changes in the oil price and economic
growth.
6. I have omitted the test results for brevity, but can provide them upon request.
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Table 2.6: Results for all manufacturing industries
Li,t−1 Wi,t−1 Zi,t−1 Qo,t−1 Yw,t−1 Po,t−1
Labor input 1.034 0.030 0.017 -0.107 0.094 -0.033
(0.000) (0.318) (0.002) (0.123) (0.181) (0.000)
Real Price of Labor -0.038 0.460 -0.003 0.064 -0.011 0.018
(0.008) (0.000) (0.698) (0.442) (0.899) (0.016)
Real Price of capital 0.267 0.173 0.678 -0.746 0.452 -0.100
(0.000) (0.328) (0.000) (0.071) (0.313) (0.006)
Oil Production - - - 0.962 -0.077 -0.027
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Real Economic Activity - - - 0.177 0.668 -0.039
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real Price of Oil - - - 3.018 -0.637 0.847
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Figure 2.1 shows the responses of labor and labor price to an oil supply
shock, an aggregate demand shock, and a precautionary oil demand shock,
such that the real price of oil rises 10% upon impact in each case. The
median impulse responses are drawn in solid blue lines, and the area between
the 16th and 84th percentiles is highlighted in green. The impulse responses
for the three type of oil shocks differ greatly in their magnitude and signs.
An increase in oil prices driven by precautionary oil demand shocks causes
a decrease in labor activity over the entire 20-year span of the model. This
shock increases the price of labor resulting from an increase in the costs of
production. An oil supply disruption causes a negative effect only in the first
year. A positive aggregate demand shock leads to a positive effect on labor
over all time periods. This shock increases the price (cost) of labor upon
impact, but the labor price subsequently decreases after the first year. These
results are consistent with findings in Somé (2012). Indeed, a precautionary
oil demand shock is not beneficial for Canadian manufacturing companies,
while an aggregate demand shock has a larger positive impact.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses for all industries
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Note: The blue lines represent the median impulse responses to different types of
oil shocks, and the green shading represents the area between the 16th and 84th
percentiles.
The means of the variance decomposition at one horizon for labor market
variables are displayed in Table 2.7. Each of the oil shocks explains less
than 10% of the variance of labor and the variance of the relative price
of labor. The contribution of aggregate demand shocks to labor variation
is larger than that of the other two shocks. In particular, the aggregate
demand shock explains 6.2% of variations in labor, while oil supply shocks
and precautionary oil demand shocks explain 1.6% and 3.6%, respectively, of
fluctuations in labor. Meanwhile, each of the oil shocks explains less than 2%
of the variation in the relative price of labor. The labor shock, the age shock,
and the capital price shock explain 30.3%, 32.0%, and 27.9%, respectively,
of the variation in labor. These shocks explain 31.5%, 32.1%, and 33.2% of
the variation in the price of labor.
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Table 2.7: Conditional Variance Decomposition (in percent)
Variable Labor
shocks
Labor
price
shocks
Capital
price
shocks
Oil
supply
shocks
Aggregate
demand
shocks
Oil-specific
demand
shocks
Labor input 30.3 30.4 27.9 1.6 6.2 3.6
Price of labor 31.5 32.1 33.2 2.0 1.1 0.2
2.6.2 Results for sub-panel groups
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show how the impulse responses of labor demand and
the price of labor vary according to the degree of trade exposure and energy
intensity. For each shock, the impulse responses are normalized such that the
real price of oil rises 10% upon impact. The impulse responses in Figure 2.2
for the different sub-panels of industries have similar paths to those obtained
using the full panel of industries. However, they differ in terms of magnitude.
The response of labor to a precautionary oil demand shock for the sub-panel
of high trade-exposed industries is greater than the response for the sub-panel
of low trade exposed industries over all time horizons. This shock causes a
larger negative effect on labor for lower trade exposed industries.
Meanwhile, the response of labor to an aggregate demand shock (or to an
oil supply shock) for the sub-panel of low trade-exposed industries is larger
than the response for the sub-panel of high trade-exposed industries over all
time horizons, which implies that oil shocks have less effect on more trade-
exposed industries. It should be noted that an aggregate demand shock
causes, at the medium run, a negative effect on labor for the sub-panel of
high trade-exposed industries. The same path is observed between energy-
intensive and low-energy industries. There is no clear relationship between
the degree of trade exposure (or energy intensity) and the response of relative
price of labor to the different types of oil shocks.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses for high and low trade-exposed industries
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Note: The blue line represents the impulse response to different types of oil shocks
for low trade-exposed industries; the red line is for high trade-exposed industries.
Figure 2.3: Impulse responses for high and low energy-intensive industries
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Note: The blue line represents the impulse response to different types of oil shocks
for low-energy industries; the red line is for energy-intensive industries.
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2.6.3 Robustness Analysis
I check the robustness of the previous results with respect to alternative
measure of labor input. I use the total jobs instead of the labor input index as
an alternative measure of labor activity to obtain the estimates and impulse
responses from analogous regressions of equation 2.4 for the full panel and
the sub-panel using the total number of jobs. Using total jobs as a measure of
labor activity allows to assess the effect on the pure number of jobs, without
any other considerations (e.g. full- or part-time, age, skills, or education).
The estimates in tables 2.8 and 2.9 are similar in format to those of tables
2.8 and 2.9 and the impulse responses in figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, are similar
in path to those of figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, suggesting that results still robust
to the use of total job as alternative measure of labor input index.
Table 2.8: Results for all manufacturing industries using total jobs as
alternative measure of labor input
Li,t−1 Wi,t−1 Zi,t−1 Qo,t−1 Yw,t−1 Po,t−1
Labor (jobs) 1.009 0.010 0.023 -0.106 0.108 -0.029
(0.000) (0.732) (0.000) (0.105) (0.116) (0.000)
Real Price of Labor -0.032 0.467 -0.004 0.068 -0.009 0.018
(0.031) (0.000) (0.560) (0.420) (0.918) (0.015)
Real Price of capital 0.267 0.147 0.687 -0.887 0.419 -0.094
(0.000) (0.404) (0.000) (0.031) (0.340) (0.012)
Oil Production - - - 0.976 -0.078 -0.027
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Real Economic Activity - - - 0.167 0.669 -0.039
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real Price of Oil - - - 3.065 -0.669 0.847
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
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Table 2.9: Conditional Variance Decomposition (in percent) using total
jobs as alternative measure of labor input
Variable Labor
shocks
Labor
price
shocks
Capital
price
shocks
Oil
supply
shocks
Aggregate
demand
shocks
Oil-specific
demand
shocks
Labor (jobs) 29.6 29.3 27.2 2.2 8.0 3.6
Price of labor 31.4 31.8 33.5 2.0 1.1 0.2
Figure 2.4: Impulse responses for all industries using total jobs as
alternative measure of labor input
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Note: The blue lines represent the median impulse to different oil shocks responses
and the green shading represents the area between the 16th and 84th percentiles.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the response of labor and the price of labor in
Canadian manufacturing industries to oil demand and oil supply shocks,
using a panel structural VAR model. I estimate the model using a fixed
effects quasi-maximum likelihood estimator developed in Binder et al. (2005),
and I identify the model by imposing zero and sign restrictions together.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses for high and low trade-exposed industries
using total jobs as alternative measure of labor input
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Note: The blue line represents the impulse response to different oil shocks for low
trade exposed industries; the red line is for high trade exposed industries.
Figure 2.6: Impulse response for high and low energy-intensive industries
using total jobs as alternative measure of labor input
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Note: The blue line represents the impulse response to different oil shocks for
low-energy industries; the red line is for energy-intensive industries.
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The estimates are qualitatively satisfactory and most of the coefficients are
statistically significant. The impulse responses of labor and the price of
labor to various types of oil shocks are different in terms of their sign and
magnitude over time.
In particular, an increase in the oil price driven by innovations in global
real economic activity tends to have a positive impact on labor demand and
the price of labor, whereas oil supply shocks and precautionary oil demand
shocks have a negative impact. Finally, the magnitudes of the effects of
the different oil shocks on labor demand depend on whether industries are
high or low net-trade exposed/energy intensive. However, there is no clear
relationship between the response of the price of labor and the degree of trade
exposure or energy intensity.
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Chapter 3
Welfare Effects of Oil Storage
3.1 Introduction
The role of storage demand on the global oil market has been the interest
of recent studies. For instance, Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), and Kilian
and Murphy (2013) among the most relevant studies, show that oil storage
demand has been historically an important factor in understanding the dy-
namic behavior of crude oil prices on the global oil market. According to
Kilian (2009), the sharp increases in the real price of oil in 1990-1991 and in
1999-2000 are almost entirely due to increases in precautionary or speculative
oil demand.
There are several reasons for carrying oil inventories: Oil storage, or oil
inventories, helps to satisfy the demand in the oil market when there is oil
supply disruptions. It facilitates delivery scheduling and provides greater
assurance of continuing production. But It can also be used for speculation
on future prices of oil.
Oil storage affects expectations about future oil prices and has a direct
effect on current oil prices. The introduction of oil storage can play a signif-
icant role in increasing uncertainty on the means and variances of oil price,
labor, and consumption, and therefore inducing welfare costs, especially for
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oil importers. Unfortunately, most of studies that analyzed the impact of
oil price fluctuations on economic activity as well as on welfare in a DSGE
model are focused on oil supply and technology shocks but do not account
for oil storage demand on the global oil market.
This paper examines the welfare effects of introducing storage as a (spec-
ulative) competitive economic activity on the global oil market. It also ex-
amines how welfare effects vary with respect to the size of oil storage under
two alternative monetary policy rules. The economic model employed in the
analysis is an extension of the three-country DSGE model of Backus and
Crucini (2000), in which I introduce oil storage as a (speculative) competi-
tive economic activity into the global oil market and nominal rigidities. The
model is characterized by two oil-importing countries (the United States and
the euro area), and one oil exporting country. Oil storage is introduce in
the model as a competitive economic activity into the global oil market, as
in Pindyck (2004). The welfare gains/costs brought about by oil storage are
measured by the compensating variations in consumption using a second or-
der approximation of the model’s equilibrium conditions around the steady
state, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007a) and Kim et al. (2008). This
procedure allows to capture the uncertainty effects of shocks both on the
means and variances of the endogenous variables.
The main contribution of this study is to evaluate the welfare implica-
tions of oil storage using a general equilibrium model that closely mimic the
features of the global oil market, where the price of oil is endogenous to the
world economy. In the existing literature, only Wright and Williams (1984)
have explicitly examined the welfare implications of introducing storage into
the oil market, but they used a partial equilibrium model. In addition, while
the literature focused on oil supply and technology shocks, this study includes
also precautionary or storage oil shocks.
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The model’s parameters are either calibrated or estimated. The esti-
mation is conduced with Euro area and United States data using Bayesian
methods. Given the estimated and calibrated values of the model’s structural
parameters, the model is simulated using a second order approximation for
the welfare analysis.
The results can be summarized as follows. Introducing competitive stor-
age into the global oil market leads to welfare gains, i.e. positive welfare
gains, for the oil exporting country, while it leads to welfare costs, i.e. neg-
ative welfare gains, for the two oil importing countries. The magnitude of
the welfare effects is increasing with respect to the steady state level of oil
storage and these welfare effects are mainly driven by oil storage shocks. I
also find that the welfare costs in the two oil importing countries are smaller
when the monetary police rules respond to the exchange rate fluctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
model. Section 3.3 describes the estimation strategy and Data. In Section
3.4, I evaluate the welfare implications of oil storage. Finally, section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Model Economy
I consider a model of world economy with two oil-importing countries
(the United States and the euro area), and one oil exporting country. The
model is closely related to the three country model of Backus and Crucini
(2000) 1, which I extend by incorporate competitive oil storage on the global
oil market and nominal rigidities. Each country in the world economy is spe-
cialized in the production of a single good. The two oil-importing countries,
produce each a manufactured good. The third country produces oil, which is
both a consumption good and an intermediate good used in the production
1. The structure of three country model aims to mimic in a simple way the interaction
between large industrialized countries and largely non-industrial oil producers.
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of manufactured goods. Consumers in the three countries are identical in
preferences. Moreover, the two oil-importing countries are symmetric in pro-
duction technologies. However, the model allows for differences in policies
and disturbances affecting each economy. Following Christiano et al. (2005),
I allow nominal and real rigidities, so that monetary policy is non-neutral.
The nominal rigidities include stickiness in price of manufactured goods and
wage through the Calvo (1983) setup. The real rigidities include capital ad-
justment costs and an endogenous interest rate risk premium that prevents
multiple steady states. I denote the two oil-importing countries by a and b,
and the oil-exporting country by o. ζa, ζb and ζo denote their relative sizes.
Because the structure of the oil-importing country blocs is symmetric, I will
focus on the the country a in describing the model, taking the country b as
the foreign economy.
3.2.1 The Oil-Importing Countries
3.2.1.1 Households
In the oil-importing country a, there is a continuum of infinitely lived
identical households, indexed by h ∈ (0, 1). The typical household h derives
utility from consumption and leisure with separable preferences. At time t,
the intertemporal utility function of a typical household h is given by
Wat (h) = Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[(
Cat+τ (h)− ~Cat+τ−1(h)
)1−σc
1− σc −AL
a
Lat+τ (h)
1+σL
1 + σL
]
(3.1)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on
information available at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is a constant discount factor,
Cat (h) is consumption in period t, Lat (h) is the fraction of total available time
devoted to productive activity in period t. The parameter σc represents the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption. The
parameter σL is the inverse of the the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and
ALa a parameter governing the level of labor supply in the steady state.
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Parameter ~ ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of internal habit formation, such that the
households’ marginal utility of consumption today is affected by the level of
aggregate consumption in the last period, Cat−1. Separability of preferences
is assumed, by simplicity, in order to ensure that households have identical
consumption and investment plans.
In each period, the typical household h is subject to the following flow
budget:
P at C
a
t (h) + P
a
I,tI
a
t (h) +
Dat (h)
Rat
+
etF
a
t (h)
F(F at )Rbt
= Dat−1(h) + etF
a
t−1(h) +W
a
t (h)L
a
t (h)(3.2)
+RaK,tK
a
t (h)− T at (h) +Divat (h)
where Iat (h) is the investment used to form new physical capital; Dat (h) and
F at (h) denote holdings of one-period domestic and foreign currency denomi-
nated bonds, with gross interest rates Rat and Rbt ; et is the nominal exchange
rate in currency of country a per unit of currency of country a. Here in par-
ticular, et is the nominal exchange rate in euros per U.S. dollar. An increase
of et means the nominal depreciation of the Euro area currency. W at (h) is
the hourly wage rate received in period t, and RaK,t is the capital return. The
household h also receives nominal dividends Divat (h) from domestic firms in
each period t. The variable T at (h) denotes lump-sum taxes that the household
h pays to the government. The term F(F at ) is a premium that households of
country a have to pay when they borrow from abroad. It ensures that the
model has a unique steady state. The function F(.) is increasing in the ratio
of the aggregate real holdings of the foreign assets:
F(F at ) = exp
(
−φF et (ζaF at − ζaF a) + φ˜t
)
(3.3)
where ζaF at =
∫ 1
0
F at (h)dh is the total level of indebtedness of the country
a and φF > 0 is a parameter that determines the debt-elasticity of interest-
rate premium. The variable φ˜t represents a shock to risk premium on foreign
bonds. This shock plays the role of an uncovered interest parity shock. The
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stock of capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kat+1(h) = (1− δ)Kat (h) + V at
(
1− S(Iat (h)/Iat−1(h))
)
Iat (h) (3.4)
where S(x) = κ
2
(x − 1)2 with κ > 0. This functional form implies that it is
costly to change the level of investment, the cost is increasing in the change
in investment, and there are no adjustment costs in steady state. Parameter
δ is the capital depreciation rate. The variable V at is an investment-specific
technology shock or the marginal efficiency of investment. It captures the
rate of transformation of investment good into installed capital to be used in
production.
In each period t, the household h chooses consumption Cat (h), nominal
domestic and foreign bonds, Dat (h) and F at (h), capital stock Kat+1(h), and
investment Iat (h) to maximize its welfare 3.1 subject to 3.2 and 3.4. The
resulting first-order conditions are as follows:
λat (h) =
(
Cat (h)− ~Cat−1(h)
)−σc − β~Et [(Cat+1(h)− ~Cat (h))−σc] (3.5)
λat (h) = βR
a
tEt
[
1
Πat+1
λat+1(h)
]
(3.6)
λat (h) = βF(F at )RbtEt
[
1
Πat+1
et+1
et
λah,t+1
]
(3.7)
qat = βEt
[(
λat+1(h)
λat (h)
)(
raK,t+1 + (1− δ)qat+1
)]
(3.8)
paI,t =q
a
t V
a
t
[
1− S
(
Iat (h)
It−1(h)
)
− S ′
(
Iat (h)
Iat−1(h)
)(
Iat (h)
Iat−1(h)
)]
+ βEt
[(
λat+1(h)
λat (h)
)
qat+1V
a
t+1S
′
(
Iat+1(h)
Iat (h)
)(
Iat+1(h)
Iat (h)
)2] (3.9)
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where Πat = P at /P at−1 is the Consumer Price Index gross inflation rate in
country a, λat (h) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the real budget
constraint and γat (h) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 3.4. paI,t =
P aI,t/P
a
t is the real price of investment, and raK,t = RaK,t/P at is the real rental
price of capital. The variable qat = γat (h)/λat (h) is the shadow price (the
Tobin’s q) in consumption units, of a unit of Kat+1 at time t. Equations 3.6
and 3.7 together imply the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition:
Et
{
λat+1(h)
P at
P at+1
(
Rat −
et+1
et
F(F at )Rbt
)}
= 0 (3.10)
Wage setting
Following Christiano et al. (2005), I assume that each household h is
a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor service. A competitive la-
bor service assembler transforms these different labor services into aggregate
labor with and associated aggregate wage index given by the Constant Elas-
ticity of Substitution (C.E.S) aggregators
Lat =
(∫ 1
0
(Lat (h))
θw−1
θw dh
) θw
θw−1
and W at =
(∫ 1
0
(W at (h))
1−θwdh
) 1
1−θw
where θw,t > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among different types of labor
and Lat is the aggregate labor demand. In the literature
θw
θw−1 represents the
markup of wages over the household.s marginal rate of substitution. The
demand for each differentiated labor service is given by:
Lat (h) =
(
W at (h)
W at
)−θw
Lat (3.11)
In any given period, a fraction 1 − ξaw of households are able to reset their
wages. The remaining fraction ξaw of households can only partially index
their wages to lagged inflation rate, i.e, wat (h) =
(
Πat−1
χw /Πat−1
)
wat−1(h),
where wat = W at /P at the real wage and χw ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of
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indexation to the lagged inflation rate. The indexation rule implies that
the real wage of an household who cannot change his wage for periods τ -
periods is wat+τ (h) =
 τ∏
s=1
Πat−1
χw
Πat−1
wat (h). The relevant part of the problem
of households resetting their wages is:
max
wat (h)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(ξawβ)
τ
U(Cat+τ (h), Lat+τ (h)) + λat+τ (h)

τ∏
s=1
Πat+s−1
χw
Πat+s
wat (h)Lat+τ (h)

(3.12)
subject to Lat+τ (h) =
 τ∏
s=1
Πat+s−1
χw
Πat+s
 wat (h)
wat+τ
−θw Lat+τ .
Because of complete markets, all households who reset their wages at time
t choose the same optimal wage, W˜ at , that satisfies the following equation:
∞∑
τ=0
(ξawβ)
τEt

1
w˜t
θw
 τ∏
s=1
Πat+s−1
χw
Πat+s
 w˜at (h)
wat+τ
−θw(σL+1)ALa(Lat+τ )σL+1
+(1− θw)λat+τ
 τ∏
s=1
Πat+s−1
χw
Πat+s
1−θw ( w˜at (h)
wat+τ
)−θw
Lat+τ

= 0(3.13)
Denoting by wat = W at /P at the real wage, the solution of the optimal real
wage w˜at can obtained recursively using the two following equations:
Xaw,t = ALa
(
w˜at
wat
)−θw(1+σL)
Lat
1+σL
+(ξawβ)Et
(
Πat
χw
Πat+1
)−θw(1+σL)( w˜at
w˜at+1
)−θw(1+σL)
Xw,t+1 (3.14)
Xaw,t =
(
θw − 1
θw
)(
w˜at
wat
)1−θw
λatw
a
t L
a
t
+(ξawβ)Et
(
Πat
χw
Πat+1
)1−θw ( w˜at
w˜at+1
)1−θw
Xw,t+1 (3.15)
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Finally, the aggregate wage index dynamic is given by:
(wat )
1−θw = ξaw
(
Πat−1
χw
Πat
wat−1
)1−θw
+ (1− ξaw)(w˜at )1−θw (3.16)
3.2.1.2 Consumption and investment good producers
The final consumption basket Cat can be regarded as produced by per-
fectly competitive consumption distributors using the following Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (C.E.S.) aggregator:
Cat =
(
(1− ωoc)
1
γo (CaZ,t)
γo−1
γo + ω
1
γo
oc (O
a
C,t)
γo−1
γo
) γo
γo−1
(3.17)
where OaC,t represents Oil consumption, and CaZ,t is a basket of non-oil con-
sumption (core consumption). Parameter γo is is the elasticity of substitution
between oil and core consumption and ωo,c defines the weight of oil in con-
sumption. The demand functions, from the profit maximization, are given
by:
CaZ,t = (1− ωoc)
(
P aZ,t
P at
)−γo
Cat and O
a
C,t = ωoc
(
etPo,t
P at
)−γo
Cat
The zero-profit condition implies that the Consumer Price Index (CPI), P at ,
is given by:
P at =
(
(1− ωoc)(P ano,t)1−γo + ωoc(etPo,t)1−γo
) 1
1−γo (3.18)
Similarly, the core consumption basket CaZ,t is produced by perfectly com-
petitive distributors using, as inputs, the manufactured goods a and b.
CaZ,t =
(
ωaac
1
γc (Caa,t)
γc−1
γc + (1− ωaac)
1
γc (Cab,t)
γc−1
γc
) γc
γc−1 (3.19)
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where γc is the elasticity of substitution between the good a and the good b in
the core consumption basket, and ωaac defines the weight of good a in the core
consumption basket. Denoting by P aZ,t, P aa,t, and P ab,t the core consumption
price index, the local price of the manufactured good a, and the price of the
manufactured good b in the country a, respectively, the demand functions,
from the profit maximization, are given by:
Caa,t = ω
a
ac
(
P aa,t
P aZ,t
)−γc
CaZ,t and C
a
b,t = (1− ωaac)
(
P ab,t
P aZ,t
)−γc
CaZ,t
The zero-profit condition implies that the Consumption Price Index (CPI)
P at is given by:
P aZ,t =
(
ωaac(P
a
a,t)
1−γc + (1− ωaac)(P ab,t)1−γc
) 1
1−γc (3.20)
Finally, investment good Iat is a basket of domestic and foreign manufac-
tured goods a and b, similar in structure to the core consumption basket.
Specifically, I assume a common home bias for both core consumption and
investment goods so that the price index associated to consumption Cat and
investment Iat are identical.
3.2.1.3 Manufactured good producers
There is a continuum of firms z ∈ (0, 1) producing differentiated domestic
manufactured goods. Firm z produces its good using capital, Kat (z), labour,
Lat (z), and oil, OaY,t(z), as inputs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Ya,t(z) = Za,t(L
a
t (z))
α
(
(1− ωoy) 1ν (Kat (z))1−
1
ν + ω
1
ν
oy(O
a
Y,t(z))
1− 1
ν
) ν(1−α)
ν−1
(3.21)
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where Za,t is a technology shock, common to all domestic manufactured good
producers and α is the share of labor in manufactured output. The form of
the production technology has been used by as in Kim and Loungani (1992)
and Backus and Crucini (2000). It implies that oil and capital are used to
produce capital services, which are combined with labor to produce goods.
Parameter ωoy is the bias towards oil of producing capital services, while ν
represents the elasticity of substitution between capital and oil.
At each period t, given the rental price of capital, RaK,t, the wage rate,
W at , and the price of oil (expressed in the currency of country b), Po,t, the
producer of the variety of manufactured good zth optimally chooses the levels
of capital Kat (z), labor Lat (z), and oil OaY,t(z) that minimize its real costs.
From the first order conditions, the demand curves for labor, capital, and oil
are given, respectively, by:
wat = α×mca,t × Ya,t(z)Lat (z) (3.22)
raK,t = mca,t × Ya,t(z)Kat (z)
(1−α)(1−ωoy) 1ν (Kat (z))1−
1
ν(
(1−ωoy) 1ν (Kat (z))1−
1
ν +ω
1
ν
oy(O
a
Y,t(z))
1− 1ν
) (3.23)
etp
a
o,t = mca,t × Ya,t(z)OaY,t(z)
(1−α)ω
1
ν
oy(O
a
Y,t(z))
1− 1ν(
(1−ωoy) 1ν (Kat (z))1−
1
ν +ω
1
ν
oy(O
a
Y,t(z))
1− 1ν
) (3.24)
where po,t = Po,t/P bt is the real price of oil, St = etP bt /P at is the real ex-
change rate, and mca,t = MCa,t/P at is the Lagrange multiplier associated to
(3.21). This later also defines the real marginal cost of domestic manufac-
tured good. Given that the production technology is the same for all firms,
the marginal cost is also the same for any firm. Using (3.22), (3.23) and
(3.24), the marginal cost can be expressed as a function of the real price of
oil, the rental price of capital, the real wage, and the level of of technology:
mca,t = Z
−1
a,t (w
a
t )
α (
(1− ωoy)(raK,t)1−ν + ωoy(Stpo,t)1−ν
) (1−α)
1−ν α−α(1− α)α−1 (3.25)
79
Price setting
I assume Local Currency Pricing (LCP) manufactured good producers, as
in Rabanal and Tuesta (2010). Firms set their prices in the buyer’s currency.
Hence, the law of one price for manufactured goods does not hold because of
market segmentation. Following Calvo (1983)’s rule, I further assume that
in each period a fraction 1 − ξp,a of domestic manufactured good producers
reset their prices, while a fraction ξp,a index their prices by past inflation of
manufactured good price index. Then, they maximize the present value of
future real profits:
max
Paa,t(z),P
b
a,t(z),P
o
a,t(z)
Et
∑∞
τ=0(ξp,aβ)
τ
(
λat+τ
λat
)
1
Pat+τ
×

((
Paa,t+τ−1
Paa,t−1
)χp
P aa,t(z)−MCa,t+τ
)
Y aa,t+τ (z)+((
P ba,t+τ−1
P ba,t−1
)χp
etP
b
a,t(z)−MCa,t+τ
)
Y ba,t+τ (z)+((
P oa,t+τ−1
P oa,t−1
)χp
etP
o
a,t(z)−MCa,t+τ
)
Y oa,t+τ (z)
 (3.26)
subject to the demand functions:
Y aa,t+τ (z) =
((
P aa,t+τ−1
P aa,t−1
)χp
P aa,t(z)
P aa,t+τ
)−θp
ζa
(
Caa,t+τ + I
a
a,t+τ +G
a
t+τ
)
(3.27)
Y ba,t+τ (z) =
((
P ba,t+τ−1
P ba,t−1
)χp
P ba,t(z)
P ba,t+τ
)−θp
ζb
(
Cba,t+τ + I
b
a,t+τ
)
(3.28)
Y oa,t+τ (z) =
((
P oa,t+τ−1
P oa,t−1
)χp
P oa,t(z)
P oa,t+τ
)−θp
ζoC
o
a,t+τ (3.29)
where P aa,t(z), P ba,t(z), and P oa,t(z) are prices of the manufactured good a
in the countries a, b, and o, respectively. The variables Y aa,t+τ (z), Y ba,t+τ (z),
and Y oa,t+τ (z), such that Ya,t+τ (z) = Y aa,t+τ (z) + Y ba,t+τ (z) + Y oa,t+τ (z), are the
associated demands for manufactured good a in each country. The terms
β
λat+τ
λat
represents the producer’s discount factor coming from the fact that
producers act in the interest of households. The parameter θp > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between the differentiated domestic manufactured
goods. It measures the degree of monopoly power of producers of these
goods, since θp
θp−1 is the markup of price over marginal cost for producers.
Parameter χp ∈ [0, 1] captures the degree of indexation. When χp = 0, there
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is no indexation and when χp = 1 there is full indexation. Given the same
marginal cost of production, all firms that reset their prices at time t choose
the same optimal price, P˜a,t, satisfying the following equations:
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(ξp,aβ)
τ
(
λat+τ
λat
)
1
Pat+τ

((
Paa,t+τ−1
Paa,t−1
)χp
P˜aa,t(z)− θpθp−1MCa,t+τ
)
Y aa,t+τ (z)((
P ba,t+τ−1
P ba,t−1
)χp
etP˜ ba,t(z)− θpθp−1MCa,t+τ
)
Y ba,t+τ (z)((
Poa,t+τ−1
Poa,t−1
)χp
etP˜ oa,t(z)− θpθp−1MCa,t+τ
)
Y oa,t+τ (z)

= 0 (3.30)
Denoting by pxa,t = P xa,t/P xt and Πxa,t = P xa,t/P xa,t−1 the real price and the gross
inflation rate of the manufactured good a in country x ∈ {a, b, o}, and by
Π˜xa,t = P˜
x
a,t/P
x
a,t, the solution of the optimal price can be obtained recursively
using the following equations:
Xap,a,t = Π˜
a
a,tp
a
a,tY
a
a,t
+(ξp,aβ)Et
(
λat+1
λat
)(
Πaa,t
χp
Πaa,t+1
)1−θp
×
(
Π˜aa,t
Π˜aa,t+1
)
Xap,a,t+1 (3.31)
Xap,a,t = mca,tY
a
a,t + (ξp,aβ)Et
(
λat+1
λat
)(
Πaa,t
χp
Πaa,t+1
)−θp
Xap,a,t+1 (3.32)
Xbp,a,t = Π˜
b
a,tStp
b
a,tY
b
a,t
+(ξp,aβ)Et
(
λat+1
λat
)(
Πba,t
χp
Πba,t+1
)1−θp (
Π˜ba,t
Π˜ba,t+1
)(
St
St+1
)
Xbp,a,t+1 (3.33)
Xbp,a,t = mca,tY
b
a,t + (ξp,aβ)Et
(
λat+1
λat
)(
Πba,t
χp
Πba,t+1
)−θp
Xbp,a,t+1 (3.34)
Xop,a,t = Π˜
o
a,t
St
Xot
poa,tY
o
a,t
+(ξp,aβ)Et
(
λat+1
λat
)(
Πoa,t
χp
Πoa,t+1
)1−θp (
Π˜oa,t
Π˜oa,t+1
)(
Xot+1St
XotSt+1
)
Xop,a,t+1(3.35)
Xop,a,t = mca,tY
o
a,t + (ξp,aβ)Et
(
λat+1
λat
)(
Πoa,t
χp
Πoa,t+1
)−θp
Xop,a,t+1 (3.36)
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Finally, from the the aggregate price dynamics we obtain the following equa-
tions:
1 = ξp,a
(
Πxa,t−1
χp
Πxa,t
)1−θp
+ (1− ξp,a)(Π˜xa,t)1−θp for x ∈ {a, b, o} (3.37)
3.2.1.4 Government and Monetary and policies
I assume that the Central Bank follows a Taylor-type rule. In particular,
the short-term nominal interest rate is set in response to deviations of CPI
inflation from its steady state level and output growth. Moreover, I allow for
the possibility of including nominal exchange rate depreciation in the policy
rule:
Rat
Ra
=
(
Rat
Ra
)ρaR [(Πat
Πa
)raΠ ( Y at
Y at−1
)ra∆y ( et
et−1
)ra∆e]1−ρaR
exp(aR,t) (3.38)
where aR,t is an uncorrelated monetary policy shock that corresponds to a
deviation from the policy rule. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) have imple-
mented similar Taylor rules. One interest of this paper is to instigate how
the the welfare effects of oil storage vary depending on whether the monetary
policy rule responds to exchange rate depreciation.
The government is assumed to consume a fixed share gy of the domestic
manufactured good amount at each period t. This consumption of amount
Gat = gyYa,t has no direct effect on household utility. Fiscal policy is spec-
ified as a zero debt policy. The government levies lump-sum taxes T at =∫ 1
0
T at (h)dh so that the government budget is balanced: T at = P aa,tGat .
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3.2.2 The Oil-Exporting Country
I consider a simplified structure of the oil-exporting country. There a
representative household in the oil-exporting country that consumes oil and
manufactured goods exclusively imported from the the two oil-importing
countries. Moreover, the oil-exporting country adopts a one-to-one peg with
the U.S. dollar (the currency of the country b). The problem of the repre-
sentative household is given by
Wot = Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτU(Cot+τ , L
o
t+τ ) (3.39)
Subject to the following budget constraint:
P ot C
o
t +
F ot
F(F ot )Rbt
= F ot−1 +W
o
t L
o
t +Div
o
t (3.40)
where Lo,t, is the labor supply and W ot the corresponding wage rate, Cot is a
consumption basket, and P ot the corresponding CPI. The composition of the
consumption basket in the oil exporting country is identical to one of the two
oil-importing countries. For simplicity, I assume that the oil producer likes
goods a and b equally well so that ωoac = 0.5. The variables F ot and Divot are
the one-period foreign bonds and the profits from oil firms.
On the the production side, I assume that the oil-exporting country is
endowed with an oil field of unbounded capacity and there is a continuum of
firms z ∈ (0, 1) that produce oil in a monopolistically competitive framework.
Each oil producer uses the following technology:
Yo,t(z) = Zo,t L
o
t (z)
α (3.41)
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where Yo,t(z) is the level of firm’s z oil production, Zo,t is an exogenous
technology common to all oil producers, and Lot (z) is the level of labor used in
oil production. As in the case of manufactured good producers, oil producers
have market power and hence fix a price with a markup over real marginal
cost but oil prices are not subject to nominal rigidities and can be adjusted
instantaneously. Given the wage rate, the optimal price for all oil producers
is given by Po,t = θoθo−1 × WtαZo,tLot α , where θo > 1 denotes the elasticity of
substitution among varieties of oil. It also corresponds to the the degree
of monopoly power of oil producers. Lot corresponds to the aggregate labor
input of all oil producers.
3.2.3 Oil Storers
Following Pindyck (2004), I assume that there are storers or speculators
on the global oil market who are allow to hold oil as inventories. These storers
are distributed across the world according to the relative country size. Oil
inventories serve to reduce costs of adjusting production over time, and also
to reduce marketing costs by facilitating production and delivery scheduling
and avoiding stockouts. The profit maximization problem for the storers is:
max
OSt
{
a Rbt
−1
Et(Po,t+1)OSt − Po,tOSt − Φ(OSt, Zos,t)− ΞtOSt
}
(3.42)
where Φ(OSt, Zos,t) is the cost of delivery scheduling and avoidance of stock-
outs, Zos,t is an exogenous storage demand shock, Ξt > 0 is the per-unit
storage cost. The parameter (1− a), with a ∈ (0, 1), is defined as the waste.
It ensures that the stock of oil inventories is stationary. From the first order
condition, the optimal demand of oil storage for speculators is given by the
following inter temporal equation:
Cyt − Ξt = Po,t − a Rbt −1Et(Po,t+1) (3.43)
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In the commodity literature, Cyt = −∂Φ(OSt, Zos,t)/∂OSt defines the marginal
convenience yield. I assume that Cyt/P bt = ψOS
−ς
t Zos,t and Ξt/P bt = Ξ, as
in Pindyck (2004). Equation 3.43 says that the expected marginal revenue
from storing a barrel of crude oil must equal to the total marginal storage
cost. The presence of oil storage has a direct effect on current oil price. An
exogenous shock on Zos,t will be interpreted as a precautionary oil demand
shock or simply an oil storage shock. The main interest of this paper is to
evaluate the welfare gains/costs for each of the three countries of introducing
storage as a competitive economic activity into the global oil market.
3.2.4 Exogenous variables
There are nine structural exogenous processes in the model. Excepted the
monetary policy shocks, each of them, in log deviations from steady state,
evolves exogenously according to the following first-order autoregressive pro-
cess:
log(Xt) = (1− ρX) log(X) + ρX log(Xt) + X,t (3.44)
where X =
{
V a, V b, Za, Zb, Zo, Zos, φ˜
}
. The persistence parameters, ρX , are
bounded between 0 and 1, and the innovations, X,t, are mutually indepen-
dent, serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with means zero and
variances σ2X . The monetary policy shocks, Rx,t, with x ∈ {a, b} are i.i.d.
and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2Rx,t.
3.2.5 Market clearing conditions
The equilibrium condition on the global market of crude oil is:
ζoYo,t = (OSt − aOSt−1) + ζoOoC,t + ζa(OaC,t +OaY,t) + ζb(ObC,t +ObY,t) (3.45)
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When there is oil storage, the oil market clearing condition implies that the
current oil production must equal the sum of oil consumption, plus the change
in oil storage, while in the absence of oil storage, the oil market clearing
condition requires only that the current oil production equals the sum of
oil consumption. The oil price Po,t must adjust endogenously to clear the
world oil market. Through the equation 3.43 and the oil market equilibrium
condition 3.45, expectations about future oil price can have a direct effect on
the current oil price. Therefore, the introduction of competitive storage into
the global oil market will induce an interrelated set of responses in the path
of prices, output, labor, consumption, and hence consumers’ welfare.
Market clearing for the two manufactured goods a and b are given by :
ζaYa,t = ζbv
b
p,a,t(C
b
a,t + I
b
a,t) + ζav
a
p,a,t(C
a
a,t + I
a
a,t +G
a
t ) + ζov
o
p,a,tC
o
a,t (3.46)
ζbYb,t = ζbv
b
p,b,t(C
b
b,t + I
b
b,t +G
b
t) + ζav
a
p,b,t(C
a
b,t + I
a
b,t) + ζov
o
p,b,tC
o
b,t (3.47)
where vxp,y,t =
∫ 1
0
(
pxy,t(z)
pxy,t
)−θp
dz for y ∈ {a, b} and x ∈ {a, b, o} measures
the price dispersion due to the Calvo price setting. As in the case of the
aggregate price index, we can show that this price dispersion index has the
following dynamics:
vxp,y,t = ξp,y
(
Πxy,t−1
χp
Πxy,t
)−θp
vxp,y,t−1 + (1− ξp,y) Π˜xy,t
−θp (3.48)
The aggregate supply of the manufactured good y ∈ {a, b} is given by
Yy,t = Zy,t L
y
t
α
(
(1− ωoy) 1ν Kyt 1−
1
ν + ω
1
ν
oy O
y
Y,t
1− 1
ν
) ν(1−α)
ν−1
(3.49)
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where Kyt =
∫ 1
0
Kyt (z)dz is the aggregate demand of capital, L
y
t =
∫ 1
0
Lyt (z)dz
aggregate labor demand, and OY yt =
∫ 1
0
OY yt (z)dz is the aggregate demand
for oil in country y. The aggregate labor supply of households is given by
Lyt = Lyt
∫ 1
0
(
wyt (h)
wyt
)−θw
dh = Lyt v
y
w,t for y ∈ {a, b} (3.50)
The variable ∆wyt defines the wage dispersion which evolves according to:
vyw,t = ξ
y
w
(
wyt−1
wyt
Πyt−1
χw
Πyt
)−θw
vyw,t−1 + (1− ξyw) Π˜yw,t
−θw for y ∈ {a, b} (3.51)
Domestic debt is in zero net supply, i.e Dbt = Dat = 0 for all t. Market
clearing for the internationally traded assets requires that the sum of the net
foreign asset position of the three countries has to add up to zero:
ζaF
a
t + ζbF
b
t + ζoF
o
t = 0 (3.52)
3.3 Data and Model Estimation
The model is transformed in real terms by deflating all nominal vari-
ables for each country by corresponding consumer price index. The models
parameters are either calibrated or estimated.
I choose to fix the parameters with standard values in the literature or
those I think are weakly identified by the dataset used for the estimation.
Table 3.1 presents the calibrated parameters. The two importing countries
a, ie. the Euro area, and b, i.e. the U.S., are assumed to have equal size
at ζa = ζb = 0.25. 2 The discount factor, β, is set at 0.99, which implies an
annual steady-state real interest rate of 4 percent. I set δ = 0.025, which
implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent. The
2. Referring to Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), I consider
that the U.S. and the Euro Area are roughly of the same size.
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exogenous government spending to domestic output ratio, gy is set at 0.20.
The parameter σc is set at 2, implying an elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion in consumption of 0.5. The inverse of the Frisch wage elasticity of labor
supply, σL, is set at unit. Parameters ALa and ALb are set so that the steady
state level of labor to total time is 1/3. The labor share, α is set at 0.64. The
bias toward domestic manufactured good, ωaac, is set at 0.95, as in Rabanal
and Tuesta (2010). The parameters ωoc and ωoy are set so that the cost of
US total oil consumption expenditure as share of GDP is 0.4, with one-third
of total oil usage accounted for by households, and two-thirds by firms. The
substitution elasticities for prices and wages, θp and θw, are set to 11 and 6,
consistent with markups equal to 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. These two later
values are also standard in the DSGE literature. Following Elekdag et al.
(2008), I assume a markup of 476 percent, i.e. θo = 1.21, for oil producers.
Following Pindyck (2004), the storage elasticity of convenience yield, ς, is set
equal to 2. The steady state levels of real price of oil and real exchange rate
are assumed to be equal to unity.
All other parameters of the model are estimated using Bayesian approach,
which is became standard in estimating DSGE models. 3 The elasticity of
substitution between oil and consumption, γo, is set at 0.4 while I set a small
value for the elasticity of substitution between capital and oil, ν = 0.2. The
Calvo parameters for price stickiness are constrained to be equal, ξp,a = ξbp,
with a prior mean at 0.75, implying average durations between price opti-
mizations of 4 quarters. The Calvo parameters for wages stickiness are also
constrained to be equal, ξaw = ξbw, with a prior mean at 0.75. The parameters
describing the monetary policy rule are set as follows. The parameters φaΠ,
φa∆y, and φa∆e, are set equal to 1.5, 0.5 and 0.10. The interest rate smoothing
parameter ρaR is set at 0.5. I choose identical priors for parameters of mon-
etary policy rule for the country b. I use beta distributions for parameters
3. The Bayesian estimation approach has been applied, for example, in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2006), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), Adolfson et al. (2007) and Rabanal and
Tuesta (2010).
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Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
Description Parameter Value
Size of country a ζa 0.25
Size of country b ζb 0.25
Size of country o ζo 0.50
Discount factor β 0.99
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025
Steady state of inflation rate Π 2%
Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc 2
Inverse of Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply σL 1
Labor share in production α 0.64
Storage elasticity of convenience yield ς 2
Per unit physical storage cost Ξ 0.005
Oil waste 1− a 0.001
Elasticity of substitution among labor services θw 6
Elasticity of substitution among manufacturing goods θp 10
Elasticity of substitution among oil θo 1.21
Bias toward domestic manufactured good in consump. ωaac 0.95
Bias towards manufactured good a in consumption ωoac 0.50
Share of Government spending to domestic production gy 0.20
Fraction of time spent working (country a and b) La, Lb 1/3
Stead state or real price of oil po 1
Stead state or real exchange rate s 1
Total oil consumption expenditure as share of GDP po ∗ (OYb +OCb)/GDPb 0.4
Share of household oil consumption to total oil cons. OYb/(OYb +OCb) 1/3
bounded between 0 and 1. For parameters assumed to be positive I use a
Inverse-gamma distribution, and for parameters bounded to be non-negative
I use gamma distribution. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the prior distribu-
tion of the estimated parameters. I report prior means, standard deviation
and prior domains for convenience.
I use nine time series in the estimation of the model. The sample period
goes from 1973:1 to 2005:4. The series includes real GDP, inflation, and
nominal interest rate for the U.S. and the Euro Area, as well as data on real
exchange rate between the Euro Area and the United States. I also include
series on real price of oil and world oil production. The real price of oil is
measured by the spot price of oil deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index.
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The spot price of oil is the West Texas Intermediate price in U.S. dollars per
barrel. The world’s oil production is measured in barrel/day. Oil production
is divided by world population of 15 years and over. The U.S. real GDP is
divided by the U.S. total population of 16 years and over, while the euro
area real GDP is divided by the euro area total population of 15 years and
over. The series on inflations are based on the Consumer Price Indexes.
The real exchange rate is obtained by multiplying the nominal exchange
rate in euros per U.S. dollar by the ratio of the U.S. CPI to the Euro Area
CPI. 4 I extract from the database of Energy Information Administration,
International Petroleum. Series on population for the Euro area and the
World are taken from World Development Indicators of the World Bank
database. The original series on world population are in annual frequency
and are converted to quarterly frequency using a quadratic interpolation. I
extract from the FRED database, maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, the nominal oil prices (OILPRICE), the real GDP, Consumer Price
Index (CPIAUCSL), and the effective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS) for
United States. The real GDP (YER), Consumer Price Index (HIPC) and
short term nominal rate (STN) for the Euro area are extracted from the
Area Wide Model (AWM) database from of the European Central Bank. All
series are seasonally adjusted.
The model parameters are estimated using the log-linearized version of
the model. Therefore, all the observable variables are transformed into log
deviations from their Hodrick-Prescott trend with a smoothing parameter of
1600. I estimate separately the model under the two restrictions r∆e > 0
and r∆e = 0 in the monetary policy rule for the country a as well as for
4. Starting in 1999 I use the official U.S.-Euro dollar exchange rate obtained from the
Fred database. Prior to 1999, I construct a synthetic bilateral exchange rate series based
on the weight U.S. dollar per National Currency Unit exchange rates for the Euro Area
countries. These weights are 0.201 for France, 0.283 for Germany, 0.111 for Spain, 0.024
for Portugal, 0.015 for Ireland, 0.195 for Italy, 0.030 for Austria, 0.069 for Netherlands,
0.036 for Belgium, 0.003 for Luxembourg, 0.017 for Finland, and 0.025 for Greece.
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Table 3.2: Prior distributions
Description Param. Shape Domain Mean S.D.
Steady state of oil storage to oil production O¯S/Y¯o G R+ 0.50 0.25
Investment adjustment costs κ G R+ 1.00 0.75
Degree of internal habit formation ~ B [0, 1) 0.65 0.10
Debt-interest rate elasticity φF G R+ 0.02 0.01
Elasticity of subst. between goods a and b γc I R++ 1.50 1.00
Elasticity of substitution between C and O γo I R++ 0.40 0.20
Elasticity of substitution between K and O ν I R++ 0.20 0.10
Calvo probability in nominal wages ξaw B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Calvo probability in nominal prices ξap B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Degree of wage indexation χw B [0, 1) 0.50 0.20
Degree of price indexation χp B [0, 1) 0.50 0.20
Monetary policy smoothing coefficient ρRa B [0, 1) 0.50 0.20
Monetary policy smoothing coefficient ρRb B [0, 1) 0.50 0.20
Monetary policy inflation coefficient rΠa G R+ 1.50 1.00
Monetary policy inflation coefficient rΠb G R+ 1.50 1.00
Monetary policy output growth coefficient r∆ya G R+ 0.50 0.20
Monetary policy output coefficient r∆yb G R+ 0.50 0.20
Monetary policy exchange rate coefficient ra∆e G R+ 0.10 0.07
Monetary policy exchange rate coefficient rb∆e G R+ 0.10 0.07
Persistence of oil storage shock ρZos B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Persistence of investment shock ρV a B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Persistence of investment shock ρV b B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Persistence of TFP shock ρZa B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Persistence of TFP shock ρZb B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Persistence of oil supply shock ρZo B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Persistence of risk premium shock ρφ˜ B [0, 1) 0.75 0.15
Standard deviation of oil storage shock σZos I R++ 2.00 2.00
Standard deviation of investment shock 100 ∗ σV a I R++ 1.00 2.00
Standard deviation of investment shock 100 ∗ σV b I R++ 1.00 2.00
Standard deviation of TFP shock 100 ∗ σZa I R++ 5.00 5.00
Standard deviation of TFP shock 100 ∗ σZb I R++ 5.00 5.00
Standard deviation of oil supply shock 100 ∗ σZo I R++ 1.00 2.00
Standard deviation of interest rate shock 100 ∗ σRa I R++ 0.20 1.00
Standard deviation of interest rate shock 100 ∗ σRb I R++ 0.20 1.00
Standard deviation of risk premium shock 100 ∗ σφ˜ I R++ 1.00 2.00
Note: N stands for Normal, B Beta, G Gamma, U Uniform, and I Inverted-Gamma1. S.D.
stands for Standard Deviation. R+ = {x | x is a nonnegative real number}, R++ = {x | x
is a strictly positive real number}.
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the country b. Table 3.3 presents the estimation results, which include the
posterior means, standard deviation together with the 90 percent highest
posterior density interval. Let’s examine in detail the estimates of the fully
model under the restriction r∆e > 0.
The steady state level of the ratio of oil storage to oil production, O¯S/Y¯o
has a posterior mean of about 0.30, which is above its prior mean. The poste-
rior mean estimates for the external habit formation parameters is ~ = 0.42,
which is between the estimates reported in Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) and
Lubik and Schorfheide (2006). Adjustment cost parameter of new investment
is estimated above its prior mean. The posterior mean of the elasticity of
substitution between manufactured goods a and b, γc, is about 1.30, which
is above the estimates report in Rabanal and Tuesta (2010). The elasticity
of substitution between oil and consumption is 0.35, which is consistent with
the estimates reported in Kilian and Murphy (2013). The posterior mean for
the elasticity of substitution between oil and capital, γo = 0.13, is close to the
calibrated value in Backus and Crucini (2000). The posterior means of γc and
γo confirm that oil is less substitutable in production that in consumption.
The posterior mean for the degree of price stickiness is estimated at ξp =
0.79, implying expected price durations of about 4.8 quarters. The degree of
wage stickiness is estimated to be ξw = 0.57, implying that nominal wages
remain unchanged, on average, for about 2.3 quarters. The estimates of ξp
and ξw are in line with Rabanal and Tuesta (2010). The posterior mean for
the degree of price indexation, χp = 0.06, is much smaller than the mean
value of the prior distribution. This small value implies that manufactured
goods’ producers in both countries are almost full forward-looking in their
price setting.
Turning to the parameters for monetary policy rules, the estimated value
of the interest rate smoothing coefficients for Euro area and U.S. are ρRa =
0.81 and ρRa = 0.71, respectively. The estimates of rΠa and rΠb , which
measure the response of monetary policy to inflation for Euro area and U.S.,
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are 2.20 and 2.37, respectively. The estimates of the posterior mean r∆Ya
and r∆Yb , which measure the response of output growth in the Euro area and
U.S., are 0.63 and 0.60 respectively. Relatively to the estimates of Rabanal
and Tuesta (2010), The monetary policy rule estimates in this work imply
strong responses to inflation and output growth movements by both the Euro
area and the U.S. monetary authorities.
Overall the estimates of the structural parameters fall within plausible
ranges in the literature. The posterior means of the estimates under the two
alternative the monetary policy rule, r∆e > and r∆e = 0 are very close (abso-
lute relative difference less than 10%) with an exception for the parameters
σZa , and σZb .
3.4 Welfare implications of oil storage
I first present the approach to evaluate the welfare implications of intro-
ducing oil storage and then, I present and discuss the results. I examine
how the conditional and unconditional welfare effects vary with respect to
the steady state level of oil storage under two alternative monetary policy
rules. In the baseline monetary policy rule, the central bank adjusts its in-
terest rate in response to deviations in CPI inflation and output growth to
their steady state levels, and also to nominal exchange rate depreciation, i.e
r∆e > 0. In the alternative monetary policy rule, the central bank adjusts
its interest rate in response only to deviations in CPI inflation and output
growth to their steady state levels, i.e. r∆e > 0.
The aggregate conditional and unconditional welfares are defined, by
Wt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(h)dh and W = E [Wt], respectively. Here, E denotes the un-
conditional expectations operator, Using the labor demand curve faced by
each household and the fact that all households have the same consumption
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plans, I obtain:
Wt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
(Ct+τ − ~Ct+τ−1)1−σc
1− σc − AL
Lt+τ 1+σL
1 + σL
]
(3.53)
E (Wt) = E
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
(Ct+τ − ~Ct+τ−1)1−σc
1− σc − AL
Lt+τ 1+σL
1 + σL
]
(3.54)
where the conditional welfare is computed given that at time t all state
variables take their steady-state values. The welfare gain of introducing oil
storage is measured by the percentage of consumption compensating varia-
tion, i.e. the fraction of lifetime consumption from the model without oil
storage, that I call m1, that should be added in order to equate the welfare
level in the model with oil storage, that I call m2. Let
{
C¯t
}∞
τ=t
denotes the
lifetime consumption and
{L¯t}∞τ=t the lifetime labor under the model m1.
The conditional welfare gain, λc,t, of introducing oil storage is obtained by
solving for λc,t the following equation:
Wt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[(
C¯t+τ − ~C¯t+τ−1
)1−σc
1− σc (1 + λc,t)
1−σc − AL L¯t+τ
1+σL
1 + σL
]
(3.55)
Similarly, the unconditional welfare gain of introducing oil storage, λut , is
obtained by solving for λc,t the following equation:
E (Wt) = E
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[(
C¯t+τ − ~C¯t+τ−1
)1−σc
1− σc (1 + λu)
1−σc − AL L¯t+τ
1+σL
1 + σL
]
(3.56)
Solving for λc,t and λu yields:
λc,t =
[Wt + W¯t,L
W¯t + W¯t,L
] 1
1−σc
− 1 (3.57)
λu =
[
E (Wt) + E
(W¯t,L)
E
(W¯t)+ E (W¯t,L)
] 1
1−σc
− 1 (3.58)
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where W¯t andWt are the conditional welfares obtained under the models m1
and m2, respectively. W¯t,L = Et
∑∞
τ=0 β
τ
[
AL
L¯t+τ 1+σL
1+σL
]
is obtained under the
model m1.
To correctly evaluate the the welfare gains, a second-order accurate ap-
proximation is necessary. However, Likelihood estimation of second-order
approximated models is difficult computationally. To deal with this compu-
tational problem, the estimation of the model is conducted based on the log
linearized model. Then, for welfare analysis, the model is simulated with the
calibrated and estimated values of the model’s parameters using a second-
order accurate approximation, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007a) and
Kim et al. (2008). I use Dynare toolbox for Matlab, developed by Adjemian
et al. (2012). 5, to calculate the second-order approximation of the model and
to get theoretical moments of the model’s endogenous variables, including the
conditional welfare Wt.
Panel A of table 3.4 presents the results of the welfare gains when simulat-
ing the model with all shocks and depending on whether or not the monetary
policy rule responds to exchange rate depreciation. For each scenario of the
monetary policy rule, I report the results at different value of the steady state
level of oil inventories by keeping all the other parameters equal to their es-
timates. The welfare gains in the table 3.4 are expressed in percentage of
consumption compensating variation. The numbers in parentheses are the
unconditional welfare gains.
When the monetary policy rule includes the exchange rate depreciation,
the welfare gains of introducing oil storage are negative (costs) and are quite
similar in magnitudes for the two oil importing countries a and b, even if
they are slightly larger for country a. The conditional welfare gains for the
country a vary between -5.95% to -0.87%, while the unconditional welfare
gains/costs range from -0.77% to -0.12%. For the country b, the conditional
5. The option for the pruning algorithm in Dynare, described in Kim et al. (2008), is
also used to obtaining a stable solution of the second-order when iteratively computing
simulations of the solution.
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welfare gains of oil storage shocks vary between -5.22% to -0.75%, while the
unconditional welfare gains/costs range from -0.75% to -0.13%. For the oil
exporting country, the welfare gains are positive and very large in magnitude.
The conditional welfare gains vary between 11.48% and 77.73%, while the un-
conditional welfare gains vary between 2.23% and 15.09%. The magnitude of
welfare gains are so large in the oil exporting country because the households
consumption in this country is exclusively financed by oil revenues.
The results in table 3.4, also show that the magnitude of the welfare
effects are slightly larger when the monetary policy rule does not responding
to exchange rate fluctuations, i.e. when r∆e = 0 than when monitory policy
rule responds to exchange rate fluctuations, i.e. when r∆e => 0. Exchange
rate stability improves only slightly the welfare costs of oil storage in both
oil importing countries.
When comparing the conditional welfare gains to the unconditional wel-
fare gains, the results clearly indicate a quite large difference in magnitude.
The magnitude of welfare gains/costs obtained using the unconditional wel-
fare measure is smaller due to the fact that the unconditional welfare compar-
ison ignores the welfare changes on the transition dynamics from one state to
another. Ignoring welfare changes during the transitional period may lead to
misleading welfare results, especially if welfare costs during the transitional
period are large enough to offset any long-term gains.
Panel B of table 3.4 shows the welfare gains/costs implied by oil storage
shocks obtained by setting all the other exogenous shocks equal to zero, i.e.
by simulating the different variants of the model with only oil storage shocks,
σZos 6= 0. The results indicate that both the conditional and unconditional
welfare effects slightly decrease for all countries. In Panel C, the different
variants of the model are simulated without oil storage shocks, i.e. with
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only σZos = 0. The welfare effects drastically decrease for all countries. The
results of welfare gains from Panels A, B and C suggest that the welfare gains
of introducing oil storage, for each of the three countries, are mainly driven
by the effects of oil storage shocks.
Overall, the results of welfare effects for the different countries are in-
teresting and qualitatively consistent with the literature. Intuitively, the
introduction of competitive oil storage contribute to increase the price of oil,
which deteriorates the trade balance of oil importing countries while improv-
ing the trade balance of the oil exporting country. Therefore, it results to
wealth transfers from oil importing countries to the oil exporting country.
This evidence is consistent with Bodenstein et al. (2007) who found that oil
market-specific shock that boosts the oil price results in a wealth transfer
toward oil exporters and depresses the oil importers consumption.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the welfare effect of introducing competitive
storage into the global oil market using a three-country DSGE model char-
acterized by two oil importing countries and one oil exporting country. The
main results indicates that the introduction of competitive oil storage leads
to a wealth transfer toward the oil exporting country. The magnitude of
the welfare effects are increasing with respect to the steady state level of
oil inventories. When using unconditional welfare comparison rather that
conditional welfare, the welfare effects are smaller due to the fact that the
unconditional welfare measure ignores the dynamic transitional effects of in-
troducing oil storage. Moreover, including the exchange rate depreciation in
the monetary policy reactions allows only to marginally reduce the welfare
costs associated with the introduction of oil storage for both oil-importing
countries.
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This work can be extended in two main directions. First, in the present
model, I conduct the welfare analysis under estimated values of the mon-
etary policy rule coefficients. I do not use optimized monetary policy rule
coefficients in which the monetary authority optimally chooses policy rule
coefficients that maximizes the aggregate utility of households, as in Bergin
et al. (2007). Second, in this work, I examined the welfare implications only
for households of introducing oil storage. It would be interesting to also ex-
amine the welfare implications for producers of the introduction oil storage.
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Table 3.3: Posterior estimates
Monetary policy rule Monetary policy rule
r∆e > 0 r∆e = 0
Parameter Density Mean S.D. 90% HPD. Mean S.D. 90% HPD.
O¯S/Y¯o Gamma 0.28 0.10 [ 0.12, 0.43] 0.31 0.11 [ 0.10, 0.48]
κ Gamma 0.50 0.10 [ 0.27, 0.72] 0.44 0.11 [ 0.27, 0.61]
~ Beta 0.42 0.12 [ 0.26, 0.57] 0.42 0.12 [ 0.27, 0.59]
φF Gamma 0.04 0.02 [ 0.00, 0.06] 0.03 0.02 [ 0.00, 0.06]
γc Inv. gamma 1.28 0.06 [ 1.19, 1.38] 1.28 0.07 [ 1.18, 1.37]
γo Inv. gamma 0.38 0.17 [ 0.30, 0.46] 0.38 0.38 [ 0.29, 0.46]
ν Inv. gamma 0.13 0.09 [ 0.08, 0.17] 0.13 0.20 [ 0.08, 0.17]
ξaw Beta 0.57 0.12 [ 0.39, 0.75] 0.56 0.13 [ 0.37, 0.74]
ξap Beta 0.79 0.02 [ 0.76, 0.82] 0.77 0.03 [ 0.74, 0.81]
χw Beta 0.52 0.27 [ 0.20, 0.86] 0.51 0.27 [ 0.19, 0.84]
χp Beta 0.11 0.06 [ 0.02, 0.20] 0.11 0.06 [ 0.02, 0.20]
ρRa Beta 0.81 0.04 [ 0.76, 0.86] 0.80 0.04 [ 0.74, 0.85]
ρRb Beta 0.71 0.05 [ 0.63, 0.79] 0.69 0.05 [ 0.62, 0.77]
rΠa Gamma 2.20 0.32 [ 1.60, 2.78] 2.05 0.33 [ 1.54, 2.56]
rΠb Gamma 2.37 0.36 [ 1.75, 2.98] 2.29 0.37 [ 1.69, 2.87]
r∆ya Gamma 0.63 0.12 [ 0.42, 0.84] 0.60 0.11 [ 0.40, 0.81]
r∆yb Gamma 0.60 0.12 [ 0.37, 0.82] 0.56 0.13 [ 0.35, 0.76]
ra∆e Gamma 0.02 0.01 [ 0.00, 0.03] 0.00 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
rb∆e Gamma 0.01 0.01 [ 0.00, 0.03] 0.00 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
ρZos Beta 0.76 0.05 [ 0.67, 0.84] 0.75 0.06 [ 0.66, 0.84]
ρV a Beta 0.49 0.07 [ 0.38, 0.61] 0.50 0.09 [ 0.38, 0.60]
ρV b Beta 0.41 0.09 [ 0.28, 0.54] 0.42 0.10 [ 0.28, 0.55]
ρZa Beta 0.26 0.09 [ 0.14, 0.37] 0.26 0.10 [ 0.14, 0.38]
ρZb Beta 0.46 0.10 [ 0.29, 0.63] 0.48 0.10 [ 0.31, 0.64]
ρZo Beta 0.82 0.09 [ 0.72, 0.93] 0.83 0.11 [ 0.72, 0.94]
ρφ˜ Beta 0.87 0.04 [ 0.81, 0.92] 0.86 0.04 [ 0.80, 0.91]
σZos Inv. gamma 1.83 0.24 [ 1.42, 2.24] 1.84 0.25 [ 1.41, 2.27]
100 ∗ σV a Inv. gamma 1.29 0.22 [ 0.77, 1.80] 1.16 0.26 [ 0.76, 1.55]
100 ∗ σV b Inv. gamma 1.58 0.24 [ 0.98, 2.12] 1.42 0.24 [ 0.96, 1.87]
100 ∗ σZa Inv. gamma 7.20 1.55 [ 4.57, 9.73] 6.43 1.63 [ 4.16, 8.75]
100 ∗ σZb Inv. gamma 5.39 1.10 [ 3.32, 7.30] 4.75 1.07 [ 3.06, 6.34]
100 ∗ σZo Inv. gamma 1.04 0.33 [ 0.64, 1.42] 0.98 0.42 [ 0.57, 1.36]
100 ∗ σRa Inv. gamma 0.17 0.01 [ 0.15, 0.19] 0.17 0.01 [ 0.14, 0.19]
100 ∗ σRb Inv. gamma 0.25 0.02 [ 0.22, 0.29] 0.25 0.02 [ 0.22, 0.28]
100 ∗ σφ˜ Inv. gamma 0.75 0.16 [ 0.50, 0.99] 0.80 0.17 [ 0.54, 1.06]
Note: For the description of the parameters, see Table 3.2. Posteriors are ob-
tained from 2 chains of 200,000 draws generated using a random walk Metropolis-Hasting
algorithm, where I discard the initial 100,000. The HPD stands for the highest posterior
density. S.D. stands for Standard Deviation.
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Table 3.4: Conditional (unconditional) welfare gains of oil storage
Monetary policy rule Monetary policy rule
r∆e > 0 r∆e = 0
O¯S/Y¯o 0.10 Est. 0.50 0.75 0.10 Est. 0.50 0.75
Panel A: Simulations with all shocks
Welfare gain -0.87 -2.03 -4.03 -5.72 -0.91 -2.10 -4.20 -5.95
in country a (-0.13) (-0.30) (-0.56) (-0.77) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.51) (-0.70)
Welfare gain -0.75 -1.75 -3.48 -4.95 -0.79 -1.83 -3.67 -5.22
in country b (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.55) (-0.75) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.54) (-0.74)
Welfare gain 11.48 26.55 52.37 74.15 12.09 27.63 55.00 77.73
in country o (2.23) (5.09) (10.02) (14.36) (2.35) (5.29) (10.53) (15.09)
Panel B: Simulations with only storage shock, i.e. σZos 6= 0
Welfare gain -0.56 -1.36 -2.80 -4.07 -0.58 -1.40 -2.91 -4.23
in country a (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.60) (-0.81) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.60) (-0.82)
Welfare gain -0.52 -1.26 -2.60 -3.77 -0.54 -1.31 -2.73 -3.96
in country b (-0.14) (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.83) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.61) (-0.83)
Welfare gain 6.47 15.80 32.64 47.41 6.75 16.33 34.13 49.54
in country o (1.33) (3.09) (5.96) (8.39) (1.33) (3.05) (5.92) (8.32)
Panel C: Simulations without oil storage shock, i.e. only σZos = 0
Welfare gain -0.31 -0.66 -1.21 -1.63 -0.33 -0.69 -1.27 -1.70
in country a (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13)
Welfare gain -0.23 -0.48 -0.87 -1.16 -0.24 -0.51 -0.93 -1.24
in country b (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10)
Welfare gain 4.93 10.62 19.56 26.55 5.25 11.18 20.70 27.99
in country o (1.49) (3.32) (6.46) (9.15) (1.61) (3.56) (6.98) (9.88)
Note: Welfare gains are expressed in per cent of consumption compensation. The
numbers in parentheses are unconditional welfare gains. Est. corresponds to the
estimates of the steady state level in oil inventories O¯S/Y¯o. In the other cases, I fix
O¯S/Y¯o = 0.10, 0.50 and 0.75. In Panel A, models are simulated with all shocks. In Panel
B, models are simulated with only oil storage shocks, i.e., only σZos 6= 0, while in Panel
C, models are simulated without oil storage shocks, i.e. only σZos = 0. All simulations
are run using the estimated parameters.
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Appendices
A Appendices of chapter 1
A.1 Data Sources
This appendix lists the time series used to construct the observable vari-
ables for the estimation. All series consist of 112 quarterly observations from
1983Q1 to 2010Q4.
Statistics Canada, Cansim Databank, table 383- 0022, millions of chained
2002 dollars seasonally adjusted at annual rate:
1. Real Gross Domestic Product, Statistics.
Personal expenditure on consumer goods and services, Statistics Canada.
2. Business gross fixed capital formation, Statistics Canada.
3. Business investment in inventories, Statistics.
Statistics Canada, Cansim Cansim Databank, table 176-0064:
5. Exchange rate, Canadian dollars per unit of United States dollar,
noon spot rate, average.
Energy Information Administration, International Petroleum, table 11.1b,
thousand barrels per day.
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6. Oil Production in Canada.
7. Oil Production in World.
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Fred Databank:
8. Civilian Non-institutional Population over 16, FRED, identification
number: CANLFTOTQDSMEI.
9. Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator (2002=1000) for Canada,
Statistics Canada, Cansim Databank, table 380-0003.
10. Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator (2009=1000) for
USA, FRED, identification number: DPCERD3Q086SBEA.
11. Crude Oil Prices in Dollars per Barrel, West Texas Intermediate,
identification number: OILPRICE.
Personal Transformations:
12. Real Per Capita Consumption = (2)/(9)/(8).
13. Real Per Capita Investment = [(3)+(4)]/(9)/(8).
14. Per Capita Oil Production in Canada= (6)/(8).
15. Per Capita Oil Production in the Rest Of World= (7-6)/(8).
16. Real Exchange Rate = (5*10)/(9).
17. Real Price of Oil = (11)/(10).
A.2 The Log-linearized model
Variables with hats correspond to their log-deviation from their steady
state level.
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1. Euler equation for consumption:
Λˆt =
1
(1− ~)(1− ~β)
(
−(Cˆt − ~Cˆt−1) + ~β(Cˆt+1 − ~Cˆt)
)
Λˆt = EtΛˆt+1 + rˆt
2. Labor supply:
−Λˆt +
(
N
1−N
)
Nˆt = wˆt
3. Log-linearized capital first-order condition
rˆt = (1− β(1− δ))Etrˆks,t+1 + β(1− δ)Etqˆs,t+1 − qˆs,t for s ∈ {o, d}
4. Log-linearized investment first-order condition
qˆs,t + AI,t = κs
(
∆Iˆs,t − βEt∆Iˆs,t+1
)
for s ∈ {o, d}
5. Capital accumulation:
Kˆs,t+1 = (1− δ)Kˆs,t + δIˆs,t + δAI,t for s ∈ {o, d}
6. Uncovered interest parity condition:
rˆt = rˆ
?
t + ΦˆB?t + Et∆sˆt+1
7. Let d?t = − etB
?
t
PY,tYt
. The Risk premium of borrowing abroad is:
ΦˆB?t = φb?
(
eD?
PY Y
)
dˆ?t
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8. Final good composition:
Yˆ zd,t = Zˆt − ϑpˆd,t
Yˆm,t = Zˆt − ϑpˆm,t
0 = ωpˆd,t + (1− ω)pˆm,t
9. Production sector of crude oil:
Yˆo,t = Aˆo,t +
(
RkoKo
PoYo
)
Kˆo,t +
(
PXX
PoYo
)
Xˆt
wˆo,t = sˆt + pˆ
?
o,t −
1
µ
Nˆo,t +
1
µ
Yˆo,t + (1− 1
µ
)Aˆo,t
pˆX,t = sˆt + pˆ
?
o,t −
1
µ
Xˆt +
1
µ
Yˆo,t +
(
1− 1
µ
)
Aˆo,t
pˆo,t = sˆt + pˆ
?
o,t
10. Supply of oil reserves:
Xˆt = 0
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11. Production sector of domestic good:
Yˆd,t = Aˆd,t + +
(
WdNd
PdYd
)
Nˆd,t
(
RkdKd
PdYd
)
Kˆd,t +
(
PoO
PdYd
)
Oˆt
wˆd,t = pˆd,t − 1
ν
Nˆd,t +
1
ν
Yˆd,t + (1− 1
ν
)Aˆd,t
rˆkd,t = pˆd,t −
1
ν
Kˆd,t +
1
ν
Yˆd,t + (1− 1
ν
)Aˆd,t
pˆo,t = pˆd,t − 1
ν
Oˆt +
1
ν
Yˆd,t + (1− 1
ν
)Aˆd,t
12. Price of imported good:
pˆm,t = sˆt + ζt
13. Foreign oil demand:
Oˆ?t = Yˆ
?
t − νpˆ?o,t
14. Exports of domestic good:
Yˆ xd,t = Yˆ
?
t − ϑx(pˆd,t − sˆt)
15. Precautionary demand of crude oil
OˆSt = θ
[
β(Etpˆ
?
o,t+1 − rˆ?t )− pˆ?o,t
]
+ Zˆos,t
16. Net exports of oil:
Yˆo,t =
O
Yo
Oˆt +
Ox
Yo
Oˆxt
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17. Net foreign asset dynamic:(
1
ΦB?R?
)(
eD?
PY Y
)
dˆ?t =
(
1
φB?R?
)(
eD?
PY Y
)
(ΦˆB?,t + rˆ
?
t )
+
(
eD?
PY Y
)(
∆sˆt −∆pˆY,t −∆Yˆt + bˆ?t−1
)
−
(
eP ?oO
x
PY Y
)(
pˆo + Oˆ
x
t − pˆY,t − Yˆt
)
−
(
PdY
x
d
PY Y
)(
pˆd + Yˆ
x
d − pˆY,t − Yˆt
)
+
(
PmYm
PY Y
)(
pˆm,t + Yˆm − pˆY,t − Yˆt
)
18. Real gross domestic product (GDP):
Yˆt =
(
P.C
PY Y
)
Cˆt +
(
P.I
PY Y
)
Iˆt +
(
eP ?oO
x
PY Y
)
Oˆxt +
(
PdY
x
d
PY Y
)
Yˆ xd,t −
(
PmYm
PY Y
)
Yˆm,t
19. GDP deflator
pˆY,t =
(
eP ?oO
x
PY Y
)
pˆo,t +
(
PdY
x
d
PY Y
)
Pˆd,t −
(
PmYm
PY Y
)
pˆm,t
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20. Markets clearing:
Nˆt =
(
No
N
) ς+1
ς
Nˆo,t +
(
Nd
N
) ς+1
ς
Nˆd,t
wˆo,t = wˆt +
1
ς
(Nˆo,t − Nˆt)
wˆd,t = wˆt +
1
ς
(Nˆd,t − Nˆt)
Iˆt =
(
Io
I
)
Iˆo,t +
(
Id
I
)
Iˆd,t
Yˆd,t =
(
Y zd
Yd
)
Yˆ zd,t +
(
Y xd
Yd
)
Yˆ xd,t
Zˆt =
(
C
Z
)
Cˆt +
(
I
Z
)
Iˆt(
OS
Y ?o
)
(OˆSt − OˆSt−1) = Yˆ ?o,t +
(
Yo
Y ?o
)
Yˆo,t −
(
O?
Y ?o
)
Oˆ?t −
(
O
Y ?o
)
Oˆt
21. Exogenous processes:
λˆt = ρλλˆ
?
t−1 + λ,t
where λ = {Y ?o , Y ?, Zos, Ao, Ad, AI , ζ}. The interest rate in the foreign
economy, which is exogenous to the domestic economy, is determined
by rˆ?t = EtYˆ ?t+1 − Yˆ ?t .
B Appendices of chapter 2
B.1 Fixed effects quasi-maximum likelihood estimator
Consider eliminating the individual fixed effects from the first difference
model:
∆Yi,t = Φ∆Yi,t−1 + ∆i,t (59)
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where the first subscript i ∈ {1, .., N} refers to the cross-sectional dimension
and the second subscript t ∈ {1, .., N} refers to the time dimension of the
panel of observations. The observations Yi,t and the disturbances i,t arem×1
vectors. Let ξi,t = Yi,t − µi for t=2,...,T, with ∆Yi,1 = −(Im − Φ)ξi,0 + i,1.
We need the following assumptions:
1. The disturbances, i,t, are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) for all i and t with E(i,t) = 0 and V ar(i,t) = Ω being a
positive definite matrix.
2. The initial deviations, ξi,0, are i.i.d. across i, with zero means and the
constant nonsingular variance E(ξi,0ξ′i,0) = Ψξi,0 .
3. The following moment restrictions are satisfied: E(κi,0u′i,0) = 0, E(κi,0∆′i,t) =
0 for t=2,...,T, where κi,0 = (Im − Φ)ξi,0.
4. The second moments of the cross-product matrix E(ri,tr′i,t), t=2,...,T,
with ri,t = (∆Y′i,1,∆′i,t)′ exist.
If the error terms and the initial observation are normally distributed,
the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is obtained by maximizing the log-
likelihood function derived from the joint density function of the vector
∆Yi = vec(∆Yi,1, ...,∆Yi,T ). The log-likelihood function is given by:
L(ρ) = −mNT
2
log(2pi)− N
2
log |Σ∆η | −
N
2
tr
(
(R′Σ−1∆ηR)
1
N
N∑
i
∆Yi∆Y′i
)
where ρ = (vec(Φ)′, vec(Ω)′, vec(Ψ)′)′ and Ψ = (Im−Φ)Ψξi,0(Im−Φ′)+Ω
is the variance-covariance matrix of the initial observation ∆Yi,1, which is not
restricted to be covariance stationary. The matrix Σ∆η has a block tridiagonal
structure, with −Ω on the first lower and upper off-diagonal blocks, and 2Ω
on all but first (1,1) diagonal blocks. The matrix R, of dimension mT ×mT ,
has Im elements on the diagonal blocks, and Φ on the first lower off-diagonal
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blocks. Formally
Σ∆η =

Ψ −Ω 0
−Ω 2Ω −Ω
. . . . . . . . .
−Ω 2Ω −Ω
0 −Ω 2Ω

and R =

Im 0
−Φ Im
. . . . . .
0 −Φ Im

B.2 Impulse Response functions and Variance decom-
position
Let (B,Φ) be any value of structural parameters such that B satisfies
Ω = BB
′. Then, the impulse response of the i-th variable to the j-th
structural shock at finite horizon h corresponds to the element in row i and
column j of the matrix
Θh = JΦ
hJ ′B
where J =
[
IM 0 ... 0
]
so that J is an M ×Mp dimensional matrix. In
this particular case, p = 1 and J is the identity matrix IM . The proportion
of the h-step forecast error variance of the i-th variable accounted for by
innovations in the j-th variable is
ωij,h =
h−1∑
k=0
(
eiΘke
′
j
)2
/
(
h−1∑
k=0
ΘkΘ
′
k
)
ii
where ej is the j-th column of the identity matrix IM and the subscript ii
refers to that element of the matrix.
B.3 Data sources and variable definitions
1. World oil production (thousands of barrels per day). Source: U.S.
Energy Information Administration.
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2. Real price of oil: obtained by the spot price of oil deflated by the
U.S. Consumer Price Index. The spot price of oil is measured by West
Texas Intermediate [OILPRICE] in dollars per barrel. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, with the series names in brackets.
3. Foreign aggregate demand for manufacturing products, Y ?w,t, is mea-
sured by the G17 Industrial Production Index. Source: Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
4. Labor input by manufacturing industries: obtained by chained-Fisher
aggregation of hours worked by all workers, classified by education,
work experience, and class of workers (paid workers versus self-employed
and unpaid family workers) using hourly compensation as weights.
Source: Statistics Canada (Cansim Table 383-0022).
5. Relative price of labor is the ratio of labor compensation to the Fisher
volume index of labor input deflated by Consumer Price Index. La-
bor compensation consists of all payments in cash or in kind made by
domestic producers to workers for services rendered. It includes the
salaries and supplementary labor income of paid workers, plus an im-
puted labor income of self-employed workers. Source: Statistics Canada
(Cansim Table 383-0022). The Industrial Product Price Index is ex-
tracted from Cansim Table 329-0057.
6. Relative price of capital is the ratio of capital cost to the Fisher vol-
ume index of capital input, deflated by Consumer Price Index. Capital
cost represents the surplus profits, depreciation, rent, and net interest
intended as compensation to the owners of capital. Capital input mea-
sures the services derived from the stock of fixed reproducible business
assets (equipment and structures), inventories, and land. It is obtained
by chained-Fisher aggregation of capital stocks using the cost of cap-
ital to determine weights. Source: Statistics Canada (Cansim Table
383-0022).

